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William W. Meissner, S.J.

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REJOINDER TO FATHER HENLE
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BOOK REVIEWS

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SOME ASPECTS OF THE *VERBUM* IN THE TEXTS OF ST. THOMAS

Mr. William W. Meissner, s.j., *received his M.A. from Saint Louis University and taught at Canisius High School (Buffalo). He is now studying theology at Woodstock College (Maryland). He has previously written for the* New Scholasticism, *the* Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, *and the* Psychological Review.

The scope of this investigation will be restricted to an examination of the relevant texts of St. Thomas Aquinas in which he discusses the *verbum* in human intellectual knowledge.[1] What is the *verbum* in itself? How does it arise in the knowing process? How does it function in different knowing situations? Careful textual analysis can help to shed some light on St. Thomas's answers to these questions and contribute to the stabilization of a Thomistic realism.

The immanent act of knowing is subsequent to, and distinct from, the series of transitive causations instituted by, and originating directly from, the external object. This psychologically preliminary series of acts terminates at the production of the intelligible *species*. It is at this point that we can begin our study of the *verbum* itself.[2]

Through the co-ordinate active causality of the agent intellect and the phantasm, a *species* is impressed on the possible intellect. This is the first intellective moment in the psychological process, such that once the *species* is produced, the possible intellect is ready for its immanent operation of intellection. The *species*, in this instance, is something like a form,[3] which actuates the potency of the possible intellect. When the intellect has been thus informed, it passes into second act and performs the operation of intellection.[4] The actual act of understanding forms, as a term of its operation, an immanently produced object, which is the *verbum* or mental word.[5] The mental word, as an object of intellection, is distinct both from the thing which is being known and from the impressed intelligible *species*, which functions as a principle of the knowing operation in which the mental word is formed.[6] Such an immanently produced object is

necessary in intellectual knowledge because the object of intellection is often something that is not present, or it is something that cannot exist in reality in the way that it is understood. Thus the intellect understands things as abstracted from material conditions. The point is that the mental word is necessary to complete the metaphysical requirements for the intellective operation.[7]

[1]We want to focus our attention on St. Thomas's treatment of the *verbum* itself. Many relevant issues are involved in the understanding of St. Thomas's development of his doctrine. Most of these issues are handled in Father Lonergan's studies on the *verbum*. See B. Lonergan, S.J., "The Concept of the *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies*, VII (1946), 349-92; VIII (1947), 35-79 and 404-44; X (1949), 3-40 and 359-93. For a brief appraisal of these early studies, see M. J. O'Connell, S.J., "St. Thomas and the *Verbum*: An Interpretation," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXIV (1946-47), 224-34. Our investigation will be restricted to the *verbum humanum* and will leave the problems involved in the *verbum divinum* untouched.

[2]The treatment of the causal complex of psychological acts which lead up to the *verbum* can be passed over quickly, so that we can take up our consideration of the *verbum* itself. An extensive development of these psychological preliminaries can be found in G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 59-85. Our consideration of the *verbum* must be seen in this more extensive context.

[3]The word "form" is a misleading translation for the Latin *species* in this connection. It is used to indicate the determining character of the *species* in relation to the possible intellect. But the *species* must not be thought to be an intellectual representative for the substantial form or accidental form of real being. The *species* also includes matter in the sense of common matter. "Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam putaverunt quod species rei naturalis sit forma solum, et quod materia non sit pars speciei. Sed secundum hoc, in definitionibus rerum naturalium non poneretur materia. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod materia est duplex, scilicet communis, et signata vel individualis: communis quidem, ut caro et os; individualis autem, ut hae carnes et haec ossa. Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi. Sicut speciem hominis abstrahit ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei, sed sunt partes individui, ut dicitur in VII *Metaph.*; et ideo sine eis considerari potest. Sed species hominis non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2).

[4]"Intellectus autem ipse, secundum quod est per speciem intelligibilem in actu, consideratur absolute. Et similiter intelligere, quod ita se habet ad intellectum in actu, sicut esse ad ens in actu" (*ibid.*, q. 34, a. 1, ad 2). "Sicut enim supra dictum est, intelligere non est actio progrediens ad aliquid extrinsecum, sed manet in operante sicut actus et perfectio ejus, prout esse est perfectio existentis: sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem" (*ibid.*, q. 14, a. 4).

[5]"Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio" (*GG*, I, cap. 53). "Ad tertium dicendum quod in parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. . . . Et utraque haec operatio coniungitur in intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3).

[6]"Haec autem intentio intellecta, cum

The production of the mental word is of a kind peculiar to intellectual generation. In the very act of understanding, the intellect produces the immanent term of its operation by a sort of emanation.[8] The mental word proceeds from the intellect, wholely and entirely, and is constituted by the intellect in its knowing act, flowing from

sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili, quae facit intellectum in actu, quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium: licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo. Per hoc enim quod species intelligibilis quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium, est similitudo rei exterioris, sequitur quod intellectus intentionem formet illi rei similem: quia *quale est unumquodque, talia operatur.* Et ex hoc quod intentio intellecta est similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus, formando hujusmodi intentionem, rem illam intelligat" (*CG*, I, cap. 53). "Quae quidem conceptio a tribus praedictis differt. A *re* quidem intellecta, quia res intellecta est interdum extra intellectum, conceptio autem intellectus non est nisi in intellectu; et iterum conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem: propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat. Differt autem a *specie* intelligibili: nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus, cum omne agens agit secundum quod est in actu; actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. Differt autem ab *actione* intellectus: quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum" (*De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 1). "Manifestum est autem quod omnis operatio intellectus procedit ab eo secundum quod est factus in actu per speciem intelligibilem, quia nihil operatur nisi secundum quod est actu. Unde necesse est quod species intelligibilis, quae est principium operationis intellectualis, differt a verbo cordis, quod est per operationem intellectus formatum; quamvis ipsum verbum possit dici forma vel species intelligibilis, sicut per intellectum constituta, prout forma artis quam intellectus adinvenit, dicitur quaedam species intelligibilis" (*Quodlibet.*, V, a. 9).

This last text provides a clear instance of St. Thomas's use of *species intelligibilis* as referring to the *verbum*, as well as to the impressed intelligible *species*. This would suggest that the expression may offer difficulty in the interpretation of certain texts and that care must be taken in judging the context in which the term *species* occurs.

In general, the other terms which St. Thomas uses to refer to these two different *species* are readily distinguishable. The impressed intelligible *species* will be referred to as *species intelligibilis*, *forma intelligibilis* and sometimes as *notitia*. The mental word has a wider variety of terms which apply to it; among them are commonly found *verbum*, *verbum cordis*, *verbum mentis* or *mentale*, *verbum intelligibile*, *verbum interius*, *intentio*, *intentio intellecta*, *conceptio*, *ratio*, *ratio intellecta*, *intellectum*. An expression which he applies to both, *species* and *verbum*, besides the *species intelligibilis* mentioned above, is that of *similitudo rei intellectae*. This last parallel reference is of some significance.

[7] "Et hoc quidem necessarium est: eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et praesentem, in quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit; et hoc non posset esse nisi intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam formaret" (*CG*, I, cap. 53).

[8] " . . . sed verbum dicit quandam emanationem intellectus, et exitum in manifestationem sui" (*In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 1). "Sicut enim in cogitatione est exitus rationis ab uno in

it as from its principle.[9] The procession is not of the act of knowing but that which is produced by and in the act of knowing, the immanent object of intellection.[10]

If every act of intellection consists in the necessary production of its proper intellective object as immediate term of that operation, it

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aliud per collationem, ita etiam ratio verbi, ut dictum est, completur in quadam emanatione et exitu ab intellectu; unde addit supra simplicem intuitum intellectus aliquid cogitationi simile" (*ibid.*, a. 1, ad 3). See also *ST*, I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 2, and a. 2.

[9]"Verbum enim manifestationem quamdam importat; manifestatio autem per se non invenitur nisi in intellectu. Si enim aliquid quod est extra intellectum manifestare dicatur, hoc non est nisi secundum quod ex ipso aliquid in intellectu relinquitur, quod postea est principium manifestativum in eo. Proximum ergo manifestans est in intellectu: sed remotum potest etiam esse extra eum; et ideo nomen verbi proprie dicitur de eo quod procedit ab intellectu. Quod vero ab intellectu non procedit, non potest verbum dici, nisi metaphorice, inquantum, scilicet, est aliquomodo manifestans . . ." (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 3). "Verumtamen proprie loquendo, verbum non dicitur nisi quod procedit ut conceptus ab intellectu, ad quod sequitur procedere in similitudinem speciei" (*In Hebr.*, cap. 1, lect. 2). "Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex ejus notitia procedens. . . . Non ergo accipienda est processio secundum quod est in corporalibus, vel per motum localem, vel per actionem alicujus causae in exteriorem effectum, ut calor a calefaciente in calefactum; sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso" (*ST*, I, q. 27, a. 1). See also *In I Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, sol.; *ibid.*, ad 3; *ibid.*, a. 3, ad 2; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9; *ibid.*, q. 10, a. 1; *ibid.*, ad 1; *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 4, ad 7; *ST*, I, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2; *ibid.*, q. 30, a. 2, ad 2.

[10]"Haec autem est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem: quod operatio voluntatis terminatur ad rem, in quibus est bonum et malum; sed operatio intellectus terminatur in mente, in qua est verum et falsum, ut dicitur in *VI Metaphys.* Et ideo voluntas non habet aliquid progrediens a seipsa, quod in ea sit nisi per modum operationis; sed intellectus habet in seipso aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per modum operationis, sed etiam per modum rei operatae. Et ideo verbum significatur ut res procedens, sed amor ut operatio procedens" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7).

[11]"Dicunt igitur quod huic actui non respondet verbum nisi inquantum ad secundum modum dicendi; et ideo quamvis dicere dicatur essentialiter et personaliter, tamen verbum non dicitur nisi personaliter. Sed hoc non videtur verum: quia non est intelligibile quod aliquid dicatur et non sit verbum; unde oportet quod quoties dicitur intelligere toties dicatur verbum. Alii dicunt, quod dicere nihil illud est in universali quam manifestare intellectum suum. Potest autem homo manifestare intellectum suum vel alteri, sicut verbo vocali, vel sibi ipsi, sicut verbo cordis. . . . Unde dicunt, quod verbum dictum de Deo semper est personale. Sed hoc non videtur verum: quia si inquiratur quid sit istud verbum quo aliquis sibi loquitur, non invenitur esse nisi conceptio intellectus. Conceptio autem intellectus est vel operatio ipsa quae est intelligere, vel species intellecta. Unde oportet quod verbum vel dicatur ipsa operatio intelligendi, vel ipsa species quae est similitudo rei intellectae; et sine utroque istorum non potest quis intelligere: utrumque enim istorum est id quo quis intelligit formaliter. Et ideo impossibile est quod accipiendo hoc modo verbum aliquis intelligat nisi verbo intellectus sui, quod sit vel operatio ejus, vel ratio operationis ad eam sicut medium cognoscendi se habens, quae est species rei intellectae" (*In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1). "Ad primum ergo dicen-

would follow that every act of actual understanding would require a mental word.[11] However, in evaluating St. Thomas's teaching on this point, it is important to remember that *intelligere*, in its proper meaning, can be nothing other than the actual immanent operation of understanding. Neither the reception of the impressed *species* nor the possession of knowledge in a habitual state demands a mental word, but the actual *intelligere* in second act is equivalently a *dicere* or expression in the intellect of the mental word.[12] There is no

dum quod cum verbum interius sit id quod intellectum est, nec hoc sit in nobis nisi secundum quod actu intelligimus verbum interius semper requirit intellectum in actu suo, qui est intelligere" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1). "Ad nonum dicendum, quod quantum ad rationem verbi pertinet, non differt utrum aliquid intelligatur per similitudinem vel essentiam. Constat enim quod interius verbum significat omne illud quod intelligi potest, sive per essentiam sive per similitudinem intelligatur; et ideo omne intellectum, sive per similitudinem sive per essentiam intelligatur, potest verbum interius dici" (*ibid.*, ad 9). "Est autem de ratione interioris verbi, quod est intentio intellecta, quod procedat ab intelligente secundum suum intelligere, cum sit quasi terminus intellectualis operationis; intellectus enim intelligendo concipit et format intentionem sive rationem intellectam, quae est interius verbum . . ." (*CG*, IV, cap. 11). "Est enim considerandum quod ipsum intelligere ex virtute intellectus procedit. Secundum autem quod intellectus actu intelligat, est in ipso id quod intelligitur. Hoc igitur quod est intellectum esse in intelligente, procedit ex virtute intellectiva intellectus, et hoc est verbum ipsius, ut supra dictum est" (*Compend. Theol.*, cap. 49). See also *In II Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 3; *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2; *ibid.*, q. 10, a. 3; *ST*, I, q. 93, a. 7.

[12] ". . . dicere autem nihil est aliud quam ex se emittere verbum. . . . Sed Anselmus accipit dicere communiter pro intelligere, et verbum proprie; et potuisset facere e converso si placuisset ei" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4). "Ipsum enim intelligere non perficitur nisi aliquid in mente intelligentis concipiatur, quod dicitur *verbum*; non enim dicimur intelligere, sed cogitare ad intelligendum, antequam conceptio aliqua in mente nostra stabiliatur" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9). "Ad octavum dicendum, quod *dicere* potest dupliciter sumi : uno modo proprie secundum quod dicere idem est quod verbum concipere; et sic dicit Augustinus quod *non singulus quisque in divinis, sed solus Pater est dicens.* Alio modo communiter, prout dicere nihil est aliud quam intelligere; et sic dicit Anselmus, quod non solum Pater est dicens, sed etiam Filius et Spiritus Sanctus; et tamen licet sint tres dicentes, est unum solum verbum—quod est Filius—quia solus Filius est conceptus Patris intelligentis et concipientis verbum" (*ibid.*, ad 8).

The distinction made in these texts between *dicere* and *intelligere* is elucidated somewhat by the following: "Anselmus vero improprie accepit dicere pro intelligere. Quae tamen differunt. Nam intelligere importat solam habitudinem intelligentis ad rem intellectam; in qua nulla ratio ordinis importatur, sed solum informatio quaedam in intellectu nostro, prout intellectus noster fit in actu per formam rei intellectae. . . . Sed dicere importat principaliter habitudinem ad verbum conceptum: nihil enim est aliud dicere quam proferre verbum. Sed mediante verbo importat habitudinem ad rem intellectam, quae in verbo prolato manifestatur intelligenti" (*ST*, I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3). "Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquid rem aliquam intelligit, pervenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum. . . . Sed ex parte intellectus, sunt vocabula adinventa ad significandum re-

succession in this production of the mental word, in the sense that it passes from potency to act. The intellect itself may pass from potency to act, but the mental word arises fully and actually in the very conceiving.[13]

It follows from what we have said already that the mental word must be distinct from the intellect itself. The mental word in human knowledge has its very existence from the act of understanding, such that for it *to be* is for it *to be understood*. Thus the limited character

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spectum intelligentis ad rem intellectam, ut patet in hoc quod dico *intelligere*: et sunt etiam alia vocabula adinventa ad significandum processum intellectualis conceptionis, scilicet ipsum *dicere* et *verbum*" (*ibid.*, q. 37, a. 1). "Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit, XV *de Trin.*, Verbum Dei representatur aliqualiter per verbum nostri intellectus, quod nihil est aliud quam quaedam acceptio actualis nostrae notitiae: cum enim id quod scimus, actu considerando concipimus, hoc verbum nostri intellectus est, et hoc est quod verbo exteriori significamus" (*Quodlibet.*, IV, a. 6).

Intelligere, then, can be applied to either the first or second act of knowing. When it is equivalent to *dicere*, however, St. Thomas will mean it as indicating the second act of actual intellection as we have pointed out. St. Thomas seems to think that this is the case, ultimately because of the finite state of our intellects as separated from their objects: "Ad quintum dicendum, quod in nobis, *dicere* non solum significat intelligere, sed intelligere, cum hoc quod est ex se exprimere aliquam conceptionem; nec aliter possumus intelligere, nisi hujusmodi conceptionem exprimendo; et ideo omne intelligere in nobis, proprie loquendo, est dicere. Sed Deus potest intelligere sine hoc quod aliquid ex ipso procedat secundum rem, quia in eo idem est intellectus et intellectum et intelligere: quod in nobis non accidit; et ideo non omne *intelligere* in Deo, proprie loquendo, dicitur *dicere*" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 5).

[13]"Necesse est igitur in corporalibus quod id quod concipitur, nondum sit: et id quod parturitur, in parturiendo non sit a parturiente distinctum. Conceptio autem et partus intelligibilis verbi non est cum motu, nec cum successione: unde simul dum concipitur, est; et simul dum parturitur, distinctum est; sicut quod illuminatur, simul dum illuminatur, illuminatum est, eo quod in illuminatione successio nulla est. Et cum hoc inveniatur in intelligibili verbo nostro, multo magis competit Verbo Dei. . . ." (*CG*, IV, cap. 11). "Similiter etiam verbum quod in mente nostra concipitur, non exit de potentia in actum nisi quatenus intellectus noster procedit de potentio in actum. Nec tamen verbum oritur ex intellectu nostro nisi prout existit in actu: simul autem cum in actu existit, est in eo verbum conceptum" (*ibid.*, cap. 14).

[14]"Dico autem *intentionem intellectam* id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta. Quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur, neque est ipsa substantia intellectus; sed est quaedam similitudo concepta in intellectu de re intellecta, quam voces exteriores significant. . . . Quod autem intentio intellecta non sit ipse intellectus in nobis, ex hoc patet quod esse intentionis intellectae in ipso intelligi consistit: non autem esse intellectus nostri, cujus esse non est suum intelligere. Cum ergo in Deo sit idem esse et intelligere, intentio intellecta in ipso est ipse ejus intellectus. Et . . . in eo est res intellecta, intelligendo enim se intelligit omnia alia, ut in Primo ostensum est; relinquitur quod in Deo intelligente Seipsum sit idem intellectus, et res quae intelligitur, et intentio intellecta. . . . Verbum igitur Dei est ipsum esse divinum et essentia ejus, et ipse verus Deus. Non autem sic est de verbo intellectus humani. Cum enim intellectus noster seipsum intelligit, aliud est esse intellectus, et aliud ipsum ejus

of the human mental word follows from the difference of *esse* and *intelligere* in the finite intellect. For the being of intellect is an *esse* properly so called, whereas the being of the mental word is none other than *intelligi*, which is the act of intellect. In God, however, *esse* and *intelligere* are identified, and thus the *Verbum divinum* possesses the fullness of the divine nature.[14]

The mental word is conceived within the mind and is ordered to the expression of the content of the mind. Man expresses his thoughts by words, pronounced vocally, and these external words immediately represent the *verbum interius* of the intellect, and, secondly, through the mental word, they refer to the existing things of reality.[15] In

intelligere: substantia enim intellectus erat in potentia intelligens antequam intelligeret actu. Sequitur ergo quod aliud sit esse intentionis intellectae, et aliud intellectus ipsius: cum intentionis intellectae esse sit ipsum intelligi. Unde oportet quod in homine intelligente seipsum verbum interius conceptum non sit homo verus, naturale esse hominis habens; sed sit *homo intellectus* tantum, quasi quaedam similitudo hominis veri ab intellectu apprehensa" (*ibid.*, cap. 11). "Considerandum est autem, quod cum in nobis sit aliud esse naturale et intelligere, oportet quod verbum in nostro intellectu conceptum, quod habet esse intelligibile tantum, alterius naturae sit quam intellectus noster, qui habet esse naturale. In Deo autem idem est esse et intelligere. Verbum igitur Dei, quod est in Deo, cujus verbum est secundum esse intelligibile, idem esse habet cum Deo, cujus est verbum" (*Compend. Theol.*, cap. 41). "Hujusmodi autem verbum nostri intellectus, est quidem extrinsecum ab esse ipsius intellectus (non enim est de essentia, sed est quasi passio ipsius), non tamen est extrinsecum ab ipso intelligere intellectus, cum ipsum intelligere compleri non possit sine verbo praedicto" (*De Pot.*, q. 8. a. 1). The same doctrine is expressed in practically the same words in *ibid.*, q. 9 a. 5, and in *In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1.

[15] "Sed nunc sermo est de vocibus significativis ex institutione humana; et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes significant immediate secundum sententiam Aristotelis. Non enim potest esse quod significet immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen 'homo' naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. Unde non potest esse quod significet hominem immediate singularem, ut Platonici posuerunt, quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis separatam. Sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate, et eis mediantibus, res" (*In I Periherm.*, lect. 2). "Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis apud nos manifestatio, quae est ad alterum, non fiat nisi per verbum vocale, tamen manifestatio ad seipsum fit etiam per verbum cordis; et haec manifestatio aliam praecedit; et ideo etiam verbum interius dicitur verbum per prius" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 5). "Ad sextum dicendum, quod Verbum incarnatum habet aliquid simile cum verbo vocis, et aliquid dissimile. Hoc quidem simile est in utroque, ratione cujus unum alteri comparatur: quod sicut vox manifestat verbum interius, ita per carnem manifestatum est Verbum aeternum. Sed quantum ad hoc est dissimile: quia ipsa caro assumpta a Verbo aeterno, non dicitur Verbum, sed ipsa vox quae assumitur ad manifestationem verbi interioris, dicitur verbum; et ideo ver-

discussing the relation of external to internal word, St. Thomas expressly denies that the external word represents or signifies the impressed intelligible *species* or anything else in the intellective process except the mental word.[16] The term *verbum*, then, can be applied to each of the three levels of vocal expression. The *verbum*

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bum vocis est aliud a verbo cordis; sed Verbum incarnatum est idem quod Verbum aeternum, sicut et verbum significatum per vocem, est idem quod verbum cordis" (*ibid.*, ad 6). "Sic igitur et id quod Verbo efficitur, verbi accipit nomen: nam et in nobis expressio interioris verbi per vocem, dicitur verbum, quasi sit *verbum verbi*, quia est interioris verbi ostensivum. Sic igitur non solum divini intellectus conceptio dicitur Verbum quod est Filius, sed etiam explicatio divini conceptus per opera exteriora, verbum Verbi nominatur . . ." (*CG*, IV, cap. 13). "Intellectum autem prout est in intelligente, est verbum quoddam intellectus: hoc enim exteriori verbo significamus quod interius in intellectu comprehendimus: sunt enim, secundum Philosophum, voces signa intellectuum" (*Compend. Theol.*, cap. 37). "Ad secundum dicendum quod circa verbum quodcumque duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipsum verbum, et ea quae verbo exprimuntur. Verbum enim vocale est quiddam ab ore hominis prolatum; sed hoc verbo exprimuntur quae verbis humanis significantur. Et eadem ratio est de verbo hominis mentali, quod nihil est aliud quam quiddam mentis conceptum, quo homo exprimit mentaliter ea de quibus cogitat" (*ST*, I-II, q. 93, a. 1, ad 2). See also *In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; *ibid.*, ad 1; *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 12; *ibid.*, a. 7; *Quodlibet.*, IV, a. 6; *ibid.*, ad 2; *ST*, I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 1.

[16]"Hoc autem sic ab intellectu conceptum dicitur *verbum interius*, hoc enim est quod significatur per vocem; non enim vox exterior significat ipsum intellectum, aut formam ipsius intelligibilem, aut ipsum intelligere, sed conceptum intellectus quo mediante significat rem: ut cum dico 'homo' vel 'homo est animal'. Et quantum ad hoc non differt utrum intellectus intelligat se, vel intelligat aliud a se. Sicut enim cum intelligit aliud a se, format conceptum illius rei quae voce significatur, ita cum intelligit seipsum, format conceptum sui, quod voce etiam potest exprimere" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 5). "De necessitate autem oportet quod illud extrinsecum animae nostrae, quod significatur exteriori verbo nostro, verbum vocetur. Utrum autem per prius conveniat nomen verbi rei exteriori voce prolatae, vel ipsi conceptioni mentis, nihil refert ad praesens. Planum est tamen quod illud quod voce significatur, interius existens in anima, prius est quam ipsum verbum exteriori voce prolatum, utpote causa ejus existens. Si ergo volumus scire quid est interius verbum mentis, videamus quid significat quod exteriori voce profertur. In intellectu autem nostro sunt tria: scilicet ipsa potentia intellectus; species rei intellectae, quae est forma ejus, se habens ad ipsum intellectum sicut species coloris ad pupillam; et tertio ipsa operatio intellectus, quae est intelligere. Nullum autem istorum significatur verbo exteriori voce prolato: nam hoc nomen *lapis* non significat substantiam intellectus, quia hoc non intendit dicere nominans; nec significat speciem, quae est qua intellectus intelligit, cum etiam hoc non sit intentio nominantis; non significat etiam ipsum intelligere, cum intelligere non sit actio exterius progrediens ab intelligente, sed in ipso manens" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1). "Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad judicandum de rebus exterioribus" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3).

[17]"Ad cujus intellectum sciendum est, quod in nobis, ut quaedam Glossa super Joan., c. 1, dicit, invenitur triplex verbum: scilicet cordis, et vocis, et quod habet imaginem vocis; cujus necessitas est, quod cum locutio nostra sit quaedam corporalis operatio, oportet quod ad ipsum concurrant ea quae ad omnem motum corporalem exiguntur. . . . Si ergo accipiatur locutio secundum quod est in parte intellectiva tantum, sic est verbum cordis quod etiam ab aliis dicitur verbum rei, quia est immediata simili-

mentis is the concept formed in the intellect. The *verbum imaginis* is the image formed in the imagination of the words by which the concept is to be expressed. The *verbum vocis*, finally, is the orally expressed word.[17] The *verbum cordis* or *mentis* is related to the externally expressed words of human speech as a sort of final and efficient or active cause. For the *verbum vocis* is ordered to the expression of the *verbum cordis* and signifies it as an intellectual exemplar.[18]

tudo ipsius rei; et a Damasceno dicitur, lib. I *Fid. Orth.*, quod est naturalis intellectus motus, velut lux ejus et splendor; et ab Augustino dicitur, lib. IX *de Trin.*, Verbum animo impressum. Secundum autem quod est in imaginatione, quando scilicet quis imaginatur voces quibus intellectus conceptum proferre valeat, sic est verbum quod habet imaginem vocis, et a Damasceno dicitur verbum in corde enuntiatum, et ab Augustino dicitur verbum cum syllabis cogitatum. Secundum autem quod iam est in corporali actione per motum linguae et aliorum instrumentorum corporalium dicitur verbum vocis; et a Damasceno verbum quod est angelus, scilicet nuntius, intelligentiae, et ab Augustino verbum cum syllabis pronuntiatum" (*In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, sol.). "Et ideo, sicut in artifice tria consideramus, scilicet finem artificii, et exemplar ipsius, et ipsum artificium iam productum, ita etiam in loquente triplex verbum invenitur: scilicet *id quod* per intellectum concipitur, ad quod significandum verbum exterius profertur: et hoc est *verbum cordis* sine voce prolatum; item *exemplar* exterioris verbi, et hoc dicitur *verbum interius* quod habet imaginem vocis; et *verbum exterius expressum*, quod dicitur *verbum vocis*. Et sicut in artifice praecedit intentio finis, et deinde sequitur excogitatio formae artificiati, et ultimo artificiatum in esse producit; ita verbum cordis in loquente est prius verbo quod habet imaginem vocis, et postremum est verbum vocis" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 1). "Respondeo dicendum quod nomen Verbi in divinis, si proprie sumatur, est nomen personale, et nullo modo essentiale. Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est quod *verbum* tripliciter quidem in nobis proprie dicitur: quarto autem modo, dicitur improprie sive figurative. Manifestius autem et communius in nobis dicitur verbum quod voce profertur. Quod quidem ab interiore procedit quantum ad duo quae in verbo exteriore inveniuntur, scilicet vox ipsa, et significatio vocis. Vox enim significat intellectus conceptum, secundum Philosophum, in libro I *Periherm.*: et iterum vox ex imaginatione procedit, ut in libro *de Anima* dicitur. Vox autem quae non est significativa, verbum dici non potest. Ex hoc ergo dicitur verbum vox exterior, quia significat interiorem mentis conceptum. Sic igitur primo et principaliter interior mentis conceptus verbum dicitur: secundario vero, ipsa vox interioris conceptus significativa: tertio vero, ipsa imaginatio vocis verbum dicitur . . ." (*ST*, I, q. 34, a. 1).

[18]"Et ideo, quia verbum exterius, cum sit sensibile, est magis notum nobis quam interius secundum nominis impositionem, per prius vocale verbum dicitur verbum quam verbum interius, quamvis verbum interius naturaliter sit prius, utpote exterioris causa efficiens et finalis. Finalis quidem, quia verbum vocale ad hoc a nobis exprimitur, ut interius verbum manifestetur, unde oportet quod verbum interius sit illud quod significatur per verbum exterius. Verbum autem quod exterius profertur, significat id quod intellectum est, non ipsum intelligere, neque hoc intellectum quod est habitus vel potentia, nisi quatenus et haec intellecta sunt: unde verbum interius est ipsum interius intellectum. Efficiens autem, quia verbum prolatum exterius, cum sit significativum ad placitum, ejus principium est voluntas, sicut et ceterorum artificiato-

The operations of the human intellect, in which it attains to real understanding of its object, are the simple grasp of a quiddity and the more complex operation of judgment.[19] The intellect performs its judicial function of affirming or denying by the composition or division of the mental words which have been previously grasped by simple apprehension.[20] The simple grasp of a quiddity constitutes a definition, and the composition or division of the intelligibilities constitutes a complex *verbum* of judicial affirmation or negation.[21]

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rum; et ideo, sicut aliorum artificiatorum praeexistit in mente artificis imago quaedam exterioris artificii, ita in mente proferentis verbum exterius, praeexistit quoddam exemplar exterioris verbi" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 1). "Ad septimum dicendum, quod ratio signi per prius convenit effectui quam causae, quando causa est effectui causa essendi, non autem significandi, sicut in exemplo proposito accidit. Sed quando effectus habet a causa non solum quod sit, sed etiam quod significet, tunc, sicut causa est prius quam effectus in essendo, ita in significando; et ideo verbum interius per prius habet rationem significationis quam verbum exterius, quia verbum exterius non instituitur ad significandum nisi per interius verbum" (*ibid.*, ad 7).

[19]"Intellectum autem, sive res intellecta, se habet ut constitutum vel formatum per operationem intellectus: sive hoc sit quidditas simplex, sive sit compositio et divisio propositionis. Has enim duas operationes intellectus Aristoteles assignat in II *de Anima*. Unam scilicet quam vocat *intelligentiam indivisibilium* qua videlicet intellectus apprehendit quod quid est alicujus rei, et hanc Arabes vocant formationem, vel imaginationem per intellectum. Aliam vero ponit, scilicet compositionem et divisionem intellectuum, quam Arabes vocant credulitatem vel fidem" (*De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 9, ad 6). This classic doctrine is repeated in *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, sol.; *ibid.*, ad 7; *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2 sol. 1; *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 1; *In Boetii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

[20]That the compositional character of judgment in reference to previous apprehensions cannot be taken as univocal will be seen later. See pp. 17-20.

[21]"Hoc ergo est primum et per se intellectum, quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive enuntiatio, secundum quod ponuntur duae operationes intellectus, in III *de Anima*" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 5). "Illud ergo proprie dicitur verbum interius quod intelligens intelligendo format. Intellectus autem duo format, secundum duas ejus operationes: nam secundum operationem suam quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, format definitionem; secundum vero operationem suam qua componit et dividit, format enuntiationem, vel aliquid hujusmodi: et ideo illud sic formatum et expressum per operationem intellectus, vel definientis vel enuntiantis, exteriore voce significatur. Unde dicit Philosophus, quod ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1). "Est autem duplex operatio intellectus, secundum Philosophum in III *de Anima*. *Una* quidem quae vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia, per quam intellectus format in seipso definitionem, vel conceptum alicujus incomplexi. *Alia* autem operatio est intellectus componentis et dividentis, secundum quam format enuntiationem. Et utrumque istorum per operationem intellectus constitutorum vocatur verbum cordis, quorum primum significatur per terminum incomplexum, secundum vero significatur per orationem" (*Quodlibet.*, V, a. 9). "Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3).

Only in this complex operation of the understanding is the full complement of reflexivity obtained. Formal truth, which is the understood adequation of intellectual knowledge and reality, is consummated only when the intellect is intentionally conformed with its real object and when the intellect is, in that very act, knowing this conformity.[22] Such a known conformity requires that the intellect, in its very act of judging, should reflect on that act and thus express the conformity of act and reality.[23] It should be stressed that

[22]"Dicendum est quod sicut verum per prius invenitur in intellectu quam in rebus, ita etiam per prius invenitur in actu intellectus componentis et dividentis quam in actu intellectus quidditates rerum formantis. Veri enim ratio consistit in adequatio rei et intellectus; idem autem non adaequatur sibi ipsi, sed aequalitas diversorum est; unde ibi primo invenitur ratio veritatis in intellectu ubi primo intellectus incipit aliquid proprium habere quod res extra animam non habet, sed aliquid ei correspondens, inter quae adaequatio attendi potest. Intellectus autem formans quidditates, non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam, sicut et sensus inquantum accipit speciem rei sensibilis; sed quando incipit judicare de re apprehensa, tunc ipsum judicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei, quod non invenitur extra in re. Sed quando adaequatur ei quod est extra in re, dicitur judicium verum esse" (*De Ver.*, q. 1. a. 3). "Respondeo dicendum quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma ejus inquantum est cognoscens. Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit: licet enim visus habeat similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest: sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo quod quid est, sed quando judicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo : nam in omni propositione aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subjectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus cognoscendo quod quid est : sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum. Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera: non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente, quod importat nomen *veri*; perfectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo proprie loquendo, veritas est in intellectu componente et dividente: non autem in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est" (*ST*, I, q. 16, a. 2).

The same doctrine is proposed in *In VI Metaphys.*, lect. 4; *In IX Metaphys.*, lect. 11; *In III de Anima*, lect. 11; *ST*, I, q. 16, a. 1; *ibid.*, q. 84, a. 6, ad 1; *ST*, II-II, q. 1, a. 2.

[23]"Respondeo dicendum quod veritas est in intellectu et in sensu, licet non eodem modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum. Consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod judicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est. Cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secun-

the reflective moment is in no way subsequent, or consequent to, the act of judging, but it is a constitutive moment of the judgment itself.[24] However, the act of judging cannot function as an object of reflection but is itself known only by the necessary formation in it of

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dum quod intellectus reflectitur supra suum actum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus ad rem: quod quidem cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus; quae cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus, in cujus natura est ut rebus conformetur; unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur" (*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 9).

[24]The text cited in the previous note, *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 9, presents some difficulties. One of the most prominent interpretations of this text is that of Boyer. See C. Boyer, S.J., "Le sens d'un texte de St. Thomas: De Ver., 1, 9." *Gregorianum*, v (1924), 424-43. This interpretation has been endorsed by other Thomists, like Garrigou-LaGrange and Father Hoenen. See P. Hoenen, S.J., *La théorie du jugement d'après St. Thomas d'Aquin* (Rome, 1953), pp. 2-3: "Voici le résultat de cette analyse pénétrante; selon St. Thomas le jugement prend naissance d'un retour, *reditus* ou *reflexio*, de l'intelligence sur une opération précédente de l'esprit, une simple appréhension, *simplex apprehensio*. . . . L'étude du P. Boyer a donc établi e.a. *deux* points. Le premier est celui-ci: l'opération sur laquelle l'esprit réfléchit pour parvenir à un jugement, n'est pas un *jugement* précédent— d'ailleurs ceci ne serait pas possible pour *tout* jugement— mais c'est vraiment une 'prima mentis operatio,' une appréhension simple. La réflexion se fait avant *tout* jugement, pas seulement avant un jugement qui est le résultat d'une recherche critique philosophique. Le second point établi par le P. Boyer se réduit à ceci: l'homme ne parvient à juger, affirmativement ou négativement, qu'après un retour critique sur ce qui est dans sa conscience pendant cette opération précédente qui est une appréhension, retour qui lui révèle la nature de cet acte d'appréhension comme nous avons dit; cette condition elle aussi concerne *tout* jugement humain."

According to this position the first contact of mind with reality is in the simple apprehension, in which the intellect attains only to the *quod quid est*. Subsequent to this act, the intellect reflects upon the already received content of the apprehension and affirms the then known conformity between apprehension and thing. The text in question says "In intellectu enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum. Consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod judicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est." These words do not refer to any sequence of intellectual acts. They indicate only that truth in the intellect is a consequence of the act of the intellect judging insofar as in such judgment the intellect is conformed to the thing. The very act of intellectual judgment is reflective.

The danger in this interpretation has been pointed out by A. M. Krapiec, O.P., "Analysis Formationis Conceptus Entis Existentialiter Considerati," *Divus Thomas*, LIX (1956), 320-50. If existence is attained by the sort of subsequent reflection of judgment which is proposed in this interpretation, we have no proof of the reality or aposteriority of our concepts. This raises the further difficult question of whether quidditative concepts would be anything more than mere subjective categories of mind. Further, in regard to being itself, the priority of apprehension involves difficulties which tend to make the intelligibility of the real distinction rather tenuous. All this means that the primitive contact of intellect with being must be at once existential and essential, apprehensive and judicial. For the primitive grasp of real being is never quidditative and nonexistential, nor existential and nonquidditative, but both quidditative and existential.

the necessary object of judgment, the mental word. Further, it would seem that the only possible locus for discerning the conformity of thing and thought is in the mental word itself, as the *similitudo rei intellectae*. On these grounds, it seems reasonable to suggest that the mental word is conformed to the reality expressed in the judgment and that it is precisely this conformity as reflectively cognized by the judging intellect that constitutes formal truth.

The essential point concerning the two acts of the intellect in relation to the formation of the mental word is that only when the intellect has reached the term of its operation is the immanent object produced. Thus, only when the mind is able to form a definition or posit a judgment is there question of a mental word. This is merely an explicitation of the previous observation that the intellect produces a mental word only in the actual operation of understanding. Understanding consists in a certain penetration or intuition by which the intellect grasps the essential intelligibility of a being or of the immediately known first principles; [25] or it may be the assertion of composition or division in a thing on the more complex level of judgment and the conformity of truth.[26]

[25] "Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc nomen intellectus sumitur ex hoc quod intima rei cognoscit; est enim intelligere quasi *intus legere*: sensus enim et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia cognoscunt; solus autem intellectus ad essentiam rei pertingit. Sed ulterius intellectus ex essentiis rerum comprehensis diversimode negotiatur ratiocinando et inquirendo. Nomen ergo intellectus dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo secundum quod se habet ad hoc tantum a quo primo nomen impositum fuit; et sic dicitur proprie intelligere cum apprehendimus quidditates rerum, vel cum intelligimus illa quae statim nota sunt intellectui notis rerum quidditatibus, sicut sunt prima principia, quae cognoscimus cum terminos cognoscimus; unde et intellectus habitus principiorum dicitur" (*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 12). "Cognito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Dicitur autem intellectus ex eo quod *intus legit* intuendo essentiam rei. Unde et in III *de Anima* dicitur, quod objectum proprium intellectus est quod quid est. Et sic convenienter cognitio principiorum quae statim innotescunt cognito quod quid est, intellectus nominatur" (*In VI Ethic.*, lect. 5).

[26] "Respondeo dicendum quod nomen intellectus quandam intimam cognitionem importat; dicitur enim intellectus quasi *intus legere*. Et hoc manifeste patet considerantibus differentiam intellectus et sensus: nam cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates sensibiles exteriores; cognitio autem intellectiva penetrat usque ad essentiam rei, objectum enim intellectus est *quod quid est*, ut dicitur in II *de Anima*. Sunt autem multa genera eorum quae interius latent, ad quae oportet cognitionem hominis quasi intrinsecus penetrare. Nam sub accidentibus latet natura rerum substantialis, sub verbis latent significata verborum, sub similitudinibus et figuris latet veritas figurata: res

It is characteristic of the operation of our intellects that the intellective intuition, which constitutes the *intelligere*, properly speaking, is often arrived at only after a series of reasoned steps. The first principles of knowledge are grasped and understood immediately and naturally, without any discursive reasoning. By successive compositions and divisions, the intellect moves from step to step of the reasoning process. At each step a new mental word arises, which serves as a stepping stone to the next composition, until the desired conclusion is reached. Thus the intellect moves from understanding to understanding through the successive formation and development of mental words. The understanding is terminated when we judge the conclusion by the naturally known first principles.[27]

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etiam intelligibiles sunt quodammodo interiores respectu rerum sensibilium quae exterius sentiuntur, et in causis latent effectus et e converso. Unde respectu horum omnium potest dici intellectus. Sed cum cognitio hominis a sensu incipiat, quasi ab exteriori, manifestum est quod quanto lumen intellectus est fortius, tanto potest magis ad intima penetrare. Lumen autem naturale nostri intellectus est finitae virtutis: unde usque ad determinatum aliquid pertingere potest. Indiget igitur homo supernaturali lumine ut ulterius penetret ad cognoscendum quaedam quae per lumen naturale cognoscere non valet" (*ST*, II-II, q. 8, a. 1).

[27]". . . intentiones a conditionibus materiae separatas differunt autem in modo: quia in cognitione veritatis ratio inquirendo pervenit, quam intellectus simplici intuitu videt; unde ratio ad intellectum terminatur; unde etiam in demonstrationibus certitudo est per resolutionem ad prima principia, quorum est intellectus" (*In II Sent.*, d. 9, q. 1, a. 8, ad 1). "Sciendum est autem, quod hoc Verbum differt a nostro verbo in tribus. Prima differentia est, secundum Augustinum, quia verbum nostrum prius est formabile, quam formatum; nam cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam; et sic est in omnibus aliis quae a nobis intelliguntur; nisi forte in primis principiis, quae cum sint simpliciter nota, absque discursu rationis statim sciuntur: quamdiu ergo sic ratiocinando intellectus jactatur hac vel illac, nec dum formatio perfecta est, nisi quando ipsam rationem rei perfecte conceperit; et tunc primo habet rationem verbi. Et inde est quod in anima nostra est cogitatio, per quam significatur ipse discursus inquisitionis, et verbum, quod est iam formatum secundum perfectam contemplationem veritatis. Sic ergo verbum nostrum primo est in potentia quam in actu" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1). "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in intellectu ratiocinante comparatur conclusio ad principium; ita in intellectu componente et dividente comparatur praedicatum ad subjectum. Si enim intellectus statim in ipso principio videret conclusionis veritatem, numquam intelligeret discurrendo vel ratiocinando. Similiter si intellectus statim in apprehensione quidditatis subjecti, haberet notitiam de omnibus quae possunt attribui subjecto vel removeri ab eo, numquam intelligeret componendo et dividendo, sed solum intelligendo quod quid est. Sic igitur patet quod ex eodem provenit quod intellectus noster intelligit discurrendo, et componendo et dividendo: ex hoc scilicet, quod non statim in prima apprehensione alicujus primi apprehensi, potest inspicere quidquid in eo virtute continetur. Quod contingit ex debilitate luminis intellectualis in nobis, sicut dictum est" (*ST*, I, q. 58, a. 4). "Ad hujus autem evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit

The ultimate reason why intellectual knowledge is forced to grow and form itself in this way is that the human intellect is a finite and imperfect instrument. In its operations, the intellect passes from potency to act. Its limited capacity will not permit it to express all of its knowledge in one mental word, but it must content itself with partial and imperfect expressions. It must grow in knowledge only by the successive formation of more and more perfect but always partial and limited expressions. For each thing that it understands, it must form a distinct mental word.[28] This limitation on the

quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili: et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum judicamus per principia per se naturaliter nota, de his quae ratiocinando invenimus" (*ibid.*, q. 79, a. 12). "Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus humanus necesse habet intelligere componendo et dividendo. Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, similitudinem quandam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium objectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc, necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere vel dividere; et ex una compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est ratiocinari" (*ibid.*, q. 85, a. 5). "Ad secundum dicendum quod discursus rationis semper incipit ab intellectu et terminatur ad intellectum: ratiocinamur enim procedendo ex quibusdam intellectis, et tunc rationis discursus perficitur quando ad hoc pervenimus ut intelligamus illud quod prius erat ignotum. Quod ergo ratiocinamur ex aliquo praecedenti intellectu procedit . . ." (*ST*, II-II, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2). See also *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, sol.; *In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 15; *ibid.*, q. 15, a. 1; *ST*, I, q. 58, a. 3; *ibid.*, q. 79, a. 8; *ST*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1.

[28] "Et similis differentia invenitur in processu qui est per viam intellectus. Verbum enim quod in nobis exprimitur per actualem considerationem quasi exortum ex aliqua principiorum consideratione, vel saltem cognitione habituali, non totum in se recipit quod est in eo a quo oritur: non enim quidquid habituali tenemus cognitioni, hoc exprimit intellectus in unius verbi conceptione, sed aliquid ejus. Similiter in consideratione unius conclusionis non exprimitur totum id quod erat in virtute principii" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 4). "Sed quia nos non totum id quod habitu scimus, actu mente concipimus sed de uno intelligibili movemur ad aliud; inde est quod in nobis non est unum solum verbum mentale: sed multa, quorum nullum adaequat nostram scientiam. Sed Deus quidquid scit actu intelligit; et ideo in mente ejus non succedit verbum verba" (*Quodlibet.*, IV, a. 6). "Scimus enim primo quod in Deo est tantum unum intelligere, non multiplex sicut in nobis: aliud enim est intelligere nostrum quo intelligimus lapidem et quo intelligimus plantam; sed unum est Dei intelligere, quo Deus intelligit et se et omnia alia. Et ideo intellectus noster concipit multa verba, sed verbum conceptum a Deo est unum tantum. Iterum intellectus noster imperfecte plerumque intelligit et seipsum et alia; intelligere autem divinum non potest esse imperfectum. Unde verbum divinum est perfectum, perfecte omnia

character of our mental operations relates back to the *species* by which the intellective potency is informed. The intelligible *species* is derived from determinate material things and obtains its intelligible status only through the causality of the agent intellect. It is likewise the nature of our intellect, as ordered to the knowledge of material quiddities, that it can accommodate only one of these *species* at a time. The *species*, acting as a sort of informing principle, exhausts the intellective potency of the possible intellect, so that in any actual consideration or intellection, the intellect is informed by only one determinate *species*. Thus, if the intellective power is to extend itself to more than one object, it must compose them into one and understand them as one.[29] The intellect can simultaneously understand subject and predicate by combining them into one proposition and holding that proposition as a single intelligible object.[30] There

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representans: verbum autem nostrum frequenter est imperfectum" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 5). "Secundo vero differentia verbi nostri ad Verbum divinum est, quia verbum nostrum est imperfectum; sed Verbum divinum est perfectissimum: quia enim nos non possumus omnes nostras conceptiones uno verbo exprimere, ideo oportet quod plura verba imperfecta formemus, per quae divisim exprimamus omnia quae in scientia nostra sunt" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1). "Verbum autem in mente conceptum, est representativum omnis ejus quod actu intelligitur. Unde in nobis sunt diversa verba, secundum diversa quae intelligimus" (*ST*, I, q. 34, a. 3).

[29]"Intellectus enim noster simul multa actu intelligere non potest, quia, cum intellectus in actu sit intellectum in actu, si plura simul actu intelligeret, sequeretur quod intellectus simul esset plura secundum unum genus, quod est impossibile. Dico autem *secundum unum genus*: quia nihil prohibet idem subjectum informari diversis formis diversorum generum, sicut idem corpus est figuratum et coloratum. Species autem intelligibiles, quibus intellectus formatur ad hoc quod sit ipsa intellecta in actu, omnes sunt unius generis: habent enim unam rationem essendi secundum esse intelligibile, licet res quarum sunt species in una essendi non conveniant ratione; unde nec contrariae sunt per contrarietatem rerum quae sunt extra animam. Et inde est quod, quando aliqua multa accipiuntur quocumque modo unita, simul intelliguntur: simul enim intelligit totum continuum, non partem post partem (*CG*, I, cap. 55). "Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus quidem potest multa intelligere per modum unius, non autem multa per modum multorum: dico autem per modum unius vel multorum, per unam, vel plures species intelligibiles. Nam modus cujusque actionis consequitur formam quae est actionis principium. Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest intelligere sub una specie, simul intelligere potest: et inde est quod Deus omnia simul videt per unum, quia omnia videt per unum, quod est essentia sua. Quaecumque vero intellectus per diversas species intelligit, non simul intelligit. Et hujus ratio est, quia impossibile est idem subjectum perfici simul pluribus formis unius generis et diversarum specierum . . . Impossibile est ergo quod idem intellectus simul perficiatur diversis speciebus intelligibilibus, ad intelligendum diversa in actu" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 4). See also *In III Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 4, ad 1; *Quodlibet.*, VII, 2; *De An.*, a. 18, ad 5; *ST*, I, q. 12, a. 10.

[30]" . . . simul enim intelligit totum continuum, non partem post partem; et similiter simul intelligit propositionem,

are differences in this matter not only among intellects at different levels of the hierarchy of being—for example, between angels and men; but even on the level of purely human cognition, superior intellects are capable of knowing more objects with fewer *species*. Thus, bright students need only a few examples in order to understand a principle, whereas particular examples must be multiplied for the duller ones. [31]

Thus the human intellect reasons and understands by the successive formation of mental words. There is a different mental word for the subject and for each accident which is found inhering in it. By the composition of these diverse mental words, they are united into the complex mental word of a proposition. The mind moves from proposition to proposition in its reasoning, and from understanding to

non prius subjectum et postea praedicatum; quia secundum unam totius speciem omnes partes cognoscit. Ex his igitur accipere possumus quod quaecumque plura una specie cognoscuntur, simul possunt intelligi" (*CG*, I, cap. 55). "Contingit autem aliqua accipi ut plura, et ut unum; sicut partes alicujus continui. Si enim unaquaeque per se accipiatur, plures sunt; unde et non una operatione, nec simul accipiuntur per sensum et intellectum. Alio modo accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum in toto: et sic simul et una operatione cognoscuntur tam per sensum quam per intellectum, dum totum continuum consideratur, ut dicitur in III *de Anima*. Et sic etiam intellectus noster simul intelligit subjectum et praedicatum prout sunt partes unius propositionis; et duo comparata, secundum quod conveniunt in una comparatione. Ex quo patet quod multa secundum quod sunt distincta, non possunt simul intelligi; sed secundum quod uniuntur in uno intelligibili, sic simul intelliguntur" (*ST*, I, q. 58, a. 2). On this composite knowing of the *verbum propositionis*, see *In III Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 4, sol.; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 14.

[31] "Similiter etiam in cognoscitivis, aliquis qui est elevatioris intellectus, ex paucis principiis penes se retentis habet in promptu procedere ad varias conclusiones, ad quas pervenire non possunt qui sunt hebetioris ingenii, nisi per varias inductiones, et per principia particulariter coaptata conclusionibus" (*De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 10). "Exemplum igitur hujus, ut dictum est, in duobus extremis accipere possumus, scilicet in intellectu divino et humano. Deus enim per unum, quod est sua essentia, cognoscit omnia; homo autem ad diversa cognoscenda diversas similitudines requirit. Qui etiam, quanto altioris fuerit intellectus, tanto ex paucioribus plura cognoscere potest: unde his qui sunt tardi intellectus, oportet exempla particularia adducere ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam" (*CG*, II, cap. 98). "Qui habet intellectum elevatum, statim, uno principio demonstrativo proposito, ex ipso multarum conclusionum cognitionem accipit: quod non convenit ei qui debilioris intellectus est; sed oportet quod ei singula explanentur. Ille igitur intellectus potest in causa cognoscere omnes causae effectus, et omnes rationes effectuum, qui causam totaliter comprehendit" (*ST*, I, q. 12, a. 8). "Et de hoc exemplum aliqualiter perspici potest. Sunt enim quidam, qui veritatem intelligibilem capere non possunt, nisi eis particulatim per singula explicetur: et hoc quidem ex debilitate intellectus eorum contingit. Alii vero, qui sunt fortioris intellectus, ex paucis multa capere possunt" (*ibid.*, q. 55, a. 3). See also *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, sol.

understanding. All learning in some way flows from a pre-existing understanding, ultimately the immediate and natural knowledge of the first principles.[32]

This sort of discussion leaves little to be desired, when it is question of the mere combination of essential concepts. But even in the simplest types of enuntiation, there is a third element that enters into the picture. When I say, "Socrates is white," I can form a concept of "Socrates" and a second concept of "white." By the simple composition of these two mental words, I can form a complex enuntiation, which I express by the proposition in question. In this case, St. Thomas seems to think of the "is" of the proposition as merely serving to indicate the connection of the predicate to the subject. The "is" is attached to the predicate and for that reason is called *tertium adjacens.* When " is" is predicated of the subject by itself, as when I say "Socrates is," the intention of the proposition is to

[32]"Sed tamen differenter se habet circa hoc intellectus divinus ab intellectu nostro. Quia intellectus noster diversas conceptiones format ad cognoscendum subjectum et accidens, et ad cognoscendum diversa accidentia; et ideo discurrit de cognitione substantiae ad cognitionem accidentis; et iterum ad hoc quod inhaerentiam unius ad alterum cognoscat, componit alteram speciem cum altera, et unit eas quodammodo; et sic in seipso enuntiabilia format" (*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 7). "Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa de quibus per signa docemur, cognoscimus quidem quantum ad aliquid, et quantum ad aliquid ignoramus; utpote si docemur quid est homo, oportet quod de eo praesciamus aliquid: scilicet rationem animalis, vel substantiae, aut saltem ipsius entis, quae nobis ignota esse non potest. Et similiter si doceamur aliquam conclusionem, oportet praescire de subjecto et passione quid sint, etiam principiis, per quae conclusio docetur, praecognitis; omnis enim disciplina fit ex praeexistenti cognitione, ut dicitur in I *Posteriorum*" (*ibid.*, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3). "Hoc enim in materialibus generationibus accidere necesse est inquantum materia generati recipit formam generantis. In generatione autem intelligibili non sic est. Non enim sic verbum ab intellectu exoritur quod pars ejus praeintelligatur ut recipiens, et pars ejus ab intellectu effluat, sed totaliter verbum ab intellectu originem habet: sicut et in nobis totaliter unum verbum ex aliis oritur, ut conclusio ex principiis" (*CG*, IV, cap. 14). "Quod quidem inconveniens ex quattuor potest considerari: primo quidem quia cum Filius in divinis procedat ut verbum, si Filius filium generaret, sequeretur quod in Deo verbum ex verbo procederet, quod quidem esse non potest nisi in intellectu inquisitivo et discursivo in quo verbum ex verbo procedit, dum ex consideratione unius veritatis in alterius veritatis considerationem procedit; quod nullo modo convenit perfectioni et simplicitati intellectus divini qui uno intuitu omnia simul videt" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9, ad 1). "Sicut si nos in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat aliud. Unde intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis, enuntiationem formando" (*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 14).

express the actual existence of the subject.[33] It is clear in this purely existential type of judgment that this is the only possible connotation of the proposition. It is not clear that the attributive type of judgment, such as "Socrates is white," does not also leave itself open to existential significance. The proposition as it stands can mean either "If Socrates exists, then Socrates includes the intelligibility of whiteness," which makes it a purely attributive judgment; or it may mean "There exists a real subject, Socrates, which has the real attribute of being white." The latter meaning would make the judgment both attributive and existential. In both types of judgment, there is a composition of subject and predicate; but clearly the significance of the "is" in each case is different. St. Thomas clearly recognized that there was such a difference.[34]

The existential "is" in these propositions is certainly not the *tertium adjacens*, and it does lend added significance to the proposition. But whence arises this added element? We cannot say that it arises in the same way as the content of subject and predicate—that is, there is no *verbum entis* produced in the intellect, which is then composed in the enuntiation with the subject and predicate. Existence is not a concept and cannot be reduced to the conceptual status of conceived essence.[35] It does not seem that St. Thomas

[33]"Circa primum duo oportet intelligere: primo quidem quid est hoc quod dicit, est *tertium adjacens praedicatur*. Ad cujus evidentiam, considerandum est quod hoc verbum *est* quandoque in enuntiatione praedicatur secundum se; ut cum dicitur, *Socrates est*: per quod nihil intendimus significare, quam quod Socrates sit in rerum natura. Quandoque vero non praedicatur per se quasi principale praedicatum, sed quasi conjunctum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum subjecto; sicut cum dicitur, *Socrates est albus*, non est intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in rerum natura, sed ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante hoc verbo *est;* et ideo in talibus, *est* praedicatur ut adjacens principali praedicato. Et dicitur esse tertium non quia sit tertium praedicatum, sed quia est tertia dictio posita in enuntiatione, quae simul cum nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum, ut sic enuntiatio dividatur in duas partes et non in tres" (*In II Periherm.*, lect. 2).

[34]"Ad secundum dicendum quod *esse* dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subjecto" (*ST*, I, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2).

[35]G. Rabeau is of the opinion that there is a separate *species intelligibilis* and a separate *verbum* for the act of existence. This would seem to constitute a gross misconception of the true character of the *actus existendi*. See G. Rabeau, *Species. Verbum.* ("Bibliothèque Thomiste," Vol. XXII. Paris: Vrin, 1938), pp. 156-159. Care must be taken to distinguish "existence" or "being" as a construct, which is capable of conceptualization, from that real

intended the composition of propositions to be relegated to logical significance only. He seems to have intended that intellectual composition and division should correspond to the various levels of composition and division in real beings.[36] Such correspondence would be useless and meaningless if St. Thomas did not intend that logical composition in judgment be capable at least of existential reference.[37] It would seem, then, that the respective significance of "is" as either purely logical and attributive, or as existential and attributive, or as simply existential, is rather a function of the operation of the intellect judging than of any intelligible content of the propositions.[38]

The mental word, as we have seen, is capable of functioning as an object of intellection without being referred to any extramental reality. It is also capable of functioning as directly referring to the real thing which is being understood. In the former instance, the affirmation of composition can be no more than an affirmation of logical composition without any existential reference. Taken in its latter function, however, the affirmation of composition in a mental word, which is immediately referred to a real thing, can indicate nothing else than the affirmation of the real composition of the really

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existence which is grasped in an immediate judgment of existence. Obviously, the conception of being-as-construct is not in question here.

[36]The relations between real composition and logical composition are indicated by St. Thomas in *ST*, I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3. The important point for our consideration is that St. Thomas recognized a correspondence to real beings. See R. J. Henle, S.J., "Existentialism and the Judgment." *Proceedings of the ACPA*, XXI (1946), 40-53.

[37]The issues in this discussion are highly complicated and deserving of more careful consideration and examination of St. Thomas's expressions than we have been able to afford here. A very helpful discussion is to be found in E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 19[2]), pp. 190-232. The relevance of the discussion to the development of an existential metaphysics is presented in Henle, "Existentialism and the Judgment."

[38]In other words, it is not the quidditative content of the propositions which determines the existential status of a given proposition. This issue was settled by Kant. But the difference between logical and existential assertion remains to be accounted for. The grasp and expression of existential intelligibility seems to be understandable in terms of the interpenetration and contact of the judging intellect and the sense powers. The immediately presented object is grasped in a single self-reflective act of judgment in which objective actuality is understood and expressed. No more than this is necessary, for the relation of acting intellect to the *esse rei* is that of act to act. The significance of "is" in an existential proposition is not a content but only the act of judgment immediately united to the actuality of being. This grasp of objectivity and existence, although it occurs in the composite—sensitive and intellective—act of perception, is nonetheless an act of the judging intellect.

[39]In any case of composition involving *verba*, there is a parallel composition of phantasms in the imagination. The intellect of man cannot understand

existing object. In neither case is there any necessity or justification for a separate *verbum* for the existential element.[39]

In all this discussion of the relation between the mental word and real being, an important point to remember is that in St. Thomas's conception of the mental word the mind forms the word not only about external reality but also about itself. In understanding itself, the intellect forms a likeness of itself in the mental word. It is precisely in this self-understanding and expressing character that the intellect provides St. Thomas with the finite analogy to the divine procession of the Trinity.[40]

But what is the nature of the mental word as a relational medium, which somehow unites the understanding subject with the understood

except by the illumination of the phantasm by the agent intellect. This effects the production of the *species* in the possible intellect. We form *verba* and understand only insofar as this causal complex is operating. Thus St. Thomas will say, "Vis cognoscitiva non cognoscit aliquid actu nisi adsit intentio: unde et phantasmata in organo conservata interdum non actu imaginamur, quia intentio non fertur ad ea; appetitus enim alias potentias in actum movet in agentibus per voluntatem. Multa igitur ad quae simul intentio non fertur, non simul intuemur. Quae autem oportet sub una intentione cadere, oportet simul esse intellecta: qui enim comparationem duorum considerat, intentionem ad utrumque dirigit et simul intuemur utrumque" (*CG*, I, cap. 55).

Further comment is added on the question of modification of phantasms for intellectual knowledge, when St. Thomas considers prophetic knowledge: "In imaginatione autem non solum sunt formae rerum sensibilium secundum quod accipiuntur a sensu, sed transmutatur diversimode: vel propter aliquam transmutationem corporalem, sicut accidit in dormientibus et furiosis; vel etiam secundum imperium rationis disponuntur phantasmata in ordine ad id quod est intelligendum. Sicut enim ex diversa ordinatione earundam litterarum accipiuntur diversi intellectus, ita etiam secundum diversam dispositionem phantasmatum resultant in intellectu diversae species intelligibiles.—Judicium autem humanae mentis fit secundum vim intellectualis luminis" (*ST*, II-II, q. 173, a. 2).

[40] "Sed in cognitione qua mens nostra cognoscit seipsam, est repraesentatio Trinitatis increatae secundum analogiam, inquantum hoc modo mens cognoscens seipsam verbum sui gignit, et ex utroque procedit amor. Sic Pater seipsum dicens, Verbum suum genuit ab aeterno, et ex utroque procedit Spiritus Sanctus" (*De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 7). "Omne autem intellectum, inquantum intellectum, oportet esse in intelligente: significat enim ipsum intelligere apprehensionem ejus quod intelligitur per intellectum; unde etiam intellectus noster, seipsum intelligens, est in seipso, non solum ut idem sibi per essentiam, sed etiam ut a se apprehensum intelligendo" (*CG*, IV, cap. 11). "Et si quidem eadem res sit intelligens et intellecta, tunc verbum est ratio et similitudo intellectus, a quo procedit; . . . . Sed quando intellectus intelligit se, tunc hujusmodi verbum est similitudo et ratio intellectus. Et ideo Augustinus ponit similitudinem Trinitatis in anima, secundum quod mens intelligit seipsam, non autem secundum quod intelligit alia" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1). See also *De Ver.*, q. 10, aa. 8-9.

reality? In the main, St. Thomas seems to consider the mental word in three distinguishable contexts: as a likeness of an immediately known reality, as a medium of knowledge, and as an object of knowledge in itself. Considering it as a likeness by which the subject knows a distinct object, St. Thomas speaks of the mental word as *that by which* the intellect knows.[41] In this context, the function of the mental word is parallel to that of the *species*, to the extent that the latter is the *primum quo* and the former the *secundum quo* of the knowing process.[42] The emphasis seems to be on the relation between the knowing subject and the known object. St. Thomas compares the impressed *species* and the mental word precisely in their function of uniting subject and object. On this level, his treatment of the mental word parallels that of the impressed *species* and in this regard is not distinguished from it.

In other contexts, St. Thomas focuses his attention on the nature of the mental word precisely as a means of knowing. In these places, he seems to prescind from the experientially immediate relation of knowing subject and known object in order to place the mental word properly in the causal complex of psychological acts which accounts for the knowing process. He will speak of the mental word as something like an intelligible instrument, which the intellect uses to

[41]"Ad quartum dicendum, quod intellectus divinus non intelligit essentiam suam per aliquam speciem differentem essentialiter aut realiter ab ipsa essentia; nihilominus tamen ipse intelligit essentiam suam per essentiam suam; unde essentia se habet ut intelligens, et ut intellecta, et ut quo intelligitur; et inquantum se habet ut intelligens, sic vere et proprie est ibi ratio intellectus, et inquantum se habet ut id quod intelligitur, est ibi vere ratio intellecti; sed inquantum se habet ut quo intelligitur, sic est ibi ratio verbi" (*In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4). "Ad tertium dicendum, quod conceptio intellectus est media inter intellectum et rem intellectam, quia ea mediante operatio intellectus pertingit ad rem. Et ideo conceptio intellectus non solum est id quod intellectum est, sed etiam id quo res intelligitur" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3).

In this context, St. Thomas uses the expression *similitudo rei intellectae* indiscriminately of both *species* and *verbum*. This usage emphasizes the parallelism between the two *species*. See note 6.

[42]"Nihilominus tamen forma praedicta est secundum quod intelligitur: quia per formam excogitatam artifex intelligit quid operandum sit; sicut in intellectu speculativo videmus quod species, qua intellectus informatur ut intelligat actu, est primum *quo* intelligitur; ex hoc autem quod est effectus in actu, per talem formam operari iam potest formando quidditates rerum et componendo et dividendo; unde ipsa quidditas formata in intellectu, vel etiam compositio et divisio, est quoddam operatum ipsius, per quod tamen intellectus venit in cognitionem rei exterioris; et si est quasi secundum *quo* intelligitur" (*De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 2).

understand.[43] It is in this vein that he will refer to the mental word as *that in which* the intellect understands.[44] In these contexts, the mental word and the *species* are compared or contrasted as knowledge media. The emphasis seems to be on the produced and formed character of the mental word in comparison with the received character of the impressed *species*. The reception of the *species* is a passion, whereas the mental word is produced and fashioned in the immanent operation of the intellect. It is in this sense that St. Thomas wishes to distinguish *verbum* and *species*, for each is a different kind of medium. Thus, when St. Thomas applies the *in quo* terminology to the mental word, his meaning must be interpreted within this kind of causal context. To transfer this treatment into the radically different context of epistemological experience is a case of mistaken identity.[45]

[43]"Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intellectus intelligit aliquid dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, et sic intelligit specie intelligibili qua fit in actu; alio modo sicut instrumento quo utitur ad aliquid intelligendum: et hoc modo intellectus verbo intelligit, quia format verbum ad hoc quod intelligat rem" (*Quodlibet.*, V, a. 9, ad 1).

[44]"Istud ergo sic expressum, scilicet formatum in anima, dicitur verbum interius; et ideo comparatur ad intellectum non sicut quo intellectus intelligit, sed sicut in quo intelligit: quia in ipso expresso et formato videt naturam rei intellectae" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1).

[45]In one place, St. Thomas considers the various *media* which can be had in intellectual knowledge. He is considering the possibility of immediate knowledge of the divine essence by created intellects. "Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est, quod in visione intellectiva triplex medium contingit esse. *Unum, sub quo* intellectus videt, quod disponit eum ad videndum; et hoc est in nobis lumen intellectus agentis, quod se habet ad intellectum possibilem nostrum, sicut lumen solis ad oculum. *Aliud* medium est *quo* videt, et hoc est species intelligibilis, quae intellectum possibilem determinat, et habet se ad intellectum possibilem, sicut species lapidis ad oculum. *Tertium* medium est *in quo* aliquid videtur; et hoc est res aliqua per quam in cognitionem alterius devenimus, sicut in effectu videmus causam, et in uno similium vel contrariorum videtur aliud; et hoc medium se habet ad intellectum, sicut speculum ad visum corporalem, in quo oculus aliquam rem videt. *Primum* ergo medium et *secundum* non faciunt mediatam visionem: immediate enim dicitur aliquid videre lapidem, quamvis eum per speciem ejus in oculo receptam et per lumen videat: quia visus non fertur in haec media tamquam in visibilia sed per haec media fertur in unum visibile, quod est extra oculum. Sed *tertium* medium facit visionem mediatam. Visus enim prius fertur in speculum sicut in visibile, quo mediante accipit speciem rei visae in specie vel speculo; similiter intellectus cognoscens causam in causato, fertur in ipsum causatum sicut in quoddam intelligibile, ex quo transit in cognitionem causae" (*Quodlibet.*, VII, a. 1). The *medium in quo* described in this passage is applied to the knowledge we have of the divine essence in this life—through its created effects. The only possible place in this categorization for the *verbum* is that of the *medium quo*. St. Thomas seems to

Finally, when St. Thomas speaks of the mental word as an object of knowledge in itself, he is always careful to distinguish this knowing situation from that in which the mental word functions as a likeness by which the intellect knows the thing.[46] Thus, the distinction of these various conceptions of the mediating function of the mental

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be referring to the impressed species in this passage under the same rubric. We might conclude from this and from what we have seen in regard to his general treatment of *species* and *verbum* as media, that the *verbum* was not a *medium in quo* for St. Thomas, at least in any meaning of that denomination which would imply experiential removal from the object of awareness. In a later text, where he is speaking of God's knowledge of things distinct from Him, St. Thomas says, "Ad sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur: uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili: sicut cum oculus videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod videtur per speciem continentis: sicut cum pars videtur in toto per speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri" (*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 5). This manner of knowing something *in alio* is then applied to God's knowledge of things distinct from Him, which things He knows in and through His own essence. God's knowledge of things is certainly in no sense mediate.

Both of these places are the only places that this survey could uncover in which St. Thomas speaks of knowledge of one thing *in* something else and uses the example of a mirror to explain his meaning. In neither of these texts does the example of the mirror apply to the *verbum*. I do not know how the application of the example of the mirror to the *verbum* ever arose, but it does not seem to fall in with the context or spirit of St. Thomas's analysis.

[46]"Sed quamvis aliquid est species vel similitudo alterius, non tamen oportet quod semper quandocumque convertitur in speciem, convertatur in illud cujus est species vel similitudo; quia in speciem vel in imaginem contingit fieri conversionem dupliciter: vel secundum quod est species talis rei, et tunc est eadem conversio in rem et in speciem rei; vel in speciem secundum quod est res quaedam; et sic non oportet quod eadem conversione convertatur quis per intellectum in speciem rei et in rem; sicut quando aliquis considerat imaginem inquantum est corpus lapideum, et quantum est similitudo Socratis vel Platonis" (*In I Sent.*, d. 27, a. 2, ad 3, sol.). ". . . unde et ipsa intentio *verbum interius* nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum. Et quidem quod praedicta intentio non sit in nobis res intellecta, inde apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem, et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus reflectitur: unde et aliae scientiae sunt de rebus, et aliae de intentionibus intellectis" (*CG*, IV, cap. 11). "Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur secundum eandem reflectionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cujus species intelligibilis est similitudo" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 2).

We might mention that this last text contains an instance of St. Thomas's use of *species intelligibilis* for the *verbum*. The expression more commonly denotes the impressed *species*. However, the expression *species intellectiva* clearly denotes the *verbum*; and further the *speciem qua intelligit*, which is itself understood, must be the *verbum* and not the impressed *species*. The continuity of the passage, then, demands that the *species intelligibilis* be a denotation of the *verbum* also. This instance is similar to, but not as clear cut as, that in *Quodlibet.*, V, a. 9. See note 6.

word in knowledge seems to depend on the direction of the intention of the intellect, as attending either to the thing in reality or to the likeness of that thing. When the intellect's attention is directed to the extramental reality, the mental word itself is no longer in the focus of awareness.

The operations of our intellect are not restricted to the formal acts of forming definitions and of judgment. We have touched on some of the related aspects of the intellect's *per accidens* functions in the discussion of the existential type of judgments.[47] No treatment of the mental word in human cognition could afford to pass over the functions of the mental word in the intellectual knowledge of material singulars.[48]

The contact of intellect with sense can be in two directions: from sense to intellect in the knowledge of singulars and from intellect to sense in the practical order. In the practical order there is a syllogistic-like movement from the universal major of the intellect, through the particular minor of sense, to the practical conclusion in a particular matter.[49] The intellect, then, properly and *per se*, knows

[47] "... intellectus noster per se loquendo, singularia non cognoscat, sed universalia tantum. ... Sed per accidens contingit quod intellectus noster singulare cognoscit" (*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 6).

[48] The character of the intellectual operation in knowledge of singulars and its relation to the sense powers has been thoroughly treated by G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., in "St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular." *New Scholasticism*, XXVI (1952), 135-66, and also in his more extensive work, *The Discursive Power* (St. Louis, 1952). Our concern here is not so much with the teaching of St. Thomas on the *continuatio* of sense and intellect or the application of universal kowledge to the particular in the speculative and practical orders. We are rather concerned with showing how these general doctrines relate to St. Thomas's teaching on the *verbum*. Thus only a few texts will be cited to give the typical formulation of these doctrines.

[49] "Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter. ... Alio modo secundum quod motus qui est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires. Et sic singularibus se immiscet mediante ratione particulari, quae est potentia quaedam individualis quae alio nomine dicitur cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum in corpore, scilicet mediam cellulam capitis. Universalem vero sententiam quam mens habet de operabilibus, non est possibile applicari ad particularem actum nisi per aliquam potentiam mediam apprehendentem singulare ut sic fiat quidam syllogismus, cujus maior sit universalis, quae est sententia mentis; minor autem singularis, quae est applicatio particularis rationis; conclusio vero electio singularis operis, ut patet per id quod habetur III *de Anima*" (*De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 5). "Ad secundum dicendum quod electio particularis operabilis est quasi conclusio syllogismi intellectus practici, ut dicitur in VII *Ethic.* Ex universali autem propositione directe non potest concludi singularis, nisi mediante aliqua

only the universal;[50] however, indirectly and by a certain reflection to the phantasm, the intellect understands and grasps the singular also.[51] There is a causal priority of sense over intellect in relation to the singular object; but as grasped in the knowing process, the singular object is both sensible and intelligible.[52]

As regards the intellective abstraction of the universal, we must be careful not to confuse the direct universal, which is immediately abstracted from the sense phantasm and predicated materially of many things, with the reflex universal, which is constituted by the operation

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singulari propositione assumpta. Unde universalis ratio intellectus practici non movet nisi mediante particulari apprehensione sensitivae partis, ut dicitur in III *de Anima*" (*ST*, I, q. 86, a. 1, ad 2).

[50]"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus noster nunc cognoscit per species a rebus acceptas, quae sunt abstractae a materia et omnibus materiae conditionibus; et ideo non potest cognoscere singularia, quorum principium est materia, sed universalia tantum" (*De An.*, a. 20, ad 1).

[51]"Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam. Et sic mens singulare cognoscit per quandam reflexionem, prout scilicet mens cognoscendo objectum suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est actus sui principium, et ulterius in phantasma a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam cognitionem de singulari accipit" (*De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 5). "Ad quintum dicendum quod intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus quia non potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasma, ut supra dictum est" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 5). "Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare: quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III *de Anima*. Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata.—Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, *Socrates est homo*" (*ibid.*, q. 86, a. 1).

[52]"Et ideo dicendum quod primo cognitum homini potest accipi dupliciter: aut secundum ordinem diversarum potentiarum; aut secundum ordinem objectorum in una potentia. Primo quidem modo, cum cognitio intellectus nostri tota derivetur a sensu, illud, quod est cognoscibile a sensu, est prius notum nobis quam illud, quod est cognoscibile ab intellectu, scilicet singulare vel sensibile intelligibile" (*In de Trin.*, q. 1, a. 3). "Intelligible" is the reading of the older editions and has some good manuscript authority (see the critical edition of Bruno Decker [Leiden: Brill, 1955], p. 71). Decker prefers "intelligibili," which would simply mean "the singular or sensible [is known before] the intelligible."

The phrase "sensibile intelligibile" presents difficulties. In the context it could mean that the object of the intellect, as intellect, was both sensible and intelligible; or, it could mean that the object of sense, was both sensible and intelligible. In either case, the singular as first known seems to be both sensible and intelligible. It is true that St. Thomas only rarely explicitly affirms the intellectual knowledge of the sensible singular (see the texts cited in note 51); he very often asserts the sensitive and/or imaginational knowledge of the intelligible. But in his doctrine of the unity of man's operations, one of these positions implies the other.

of the intellect in a reflex moment as formally universal and as such impossible of predication.[53] Thus, when the intellect, in its operation of composition or division, forms a mental word, it is not entirely adequate to describe the intelligibilities involved in the judgment as universal. Rather, they are neither universal nor singular, but abstract. And as such, they can be applied in predication to one or more subjects precisely because the intellect, acting in conjunction with sense, finds the *ratio intelligibilitatis* verified in the object of its knowledge; that is, in the sensible, material existent.

The interpenetration of sense and intellect permeates all of human cognition, even to the level of scientific knowledge. St. Thomas remarks that only when a man has reduced the universal knowledge of principles to the actual knowledge of particular principles, can he be said to have acquired scientific knowledge.[54] But the application of principles does not stop there; it extends even to the level of singular, material things. Such an application of universal principles to particular things can be effected only by the *reflexio* of intellect to the lower powers of sense.[55] So intimate and necessary is this connection of sense

[53]"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod universale dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod natura universalis consideratur simul cum intentione universalitatis. Et cum intentio universalitatis, ut scilicet unum et idem habeat habitudinem ad multa, proveniat ex abstractione intellectus, oportet quod secundum hunc modum universale sit posterius. Unde in I *de Anima* dicitur quod *animal universale aut nihil est, aut posterius est* . . . . Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam naturam, scilicet animalitatis vel humanitatis, prout invenitur in particularibus" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 3, ad 1).

[54]"Similiter etiam dicendum de scientiae acquisitione; quod praeexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint complexa, ut dignitates, sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unius, et hujusmodi, quae statim intellectus apprehendit. Ex istis autem principiis universalibus omnia principia sequuntur, sicut ex quibusdam rationibus seminalibus. Quando ergo ex istis universalibus cognitionibus mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia, quae prius in potentia, et quasi in universali cognoscebantur, tunc aliquis dicitur scientiam acquirere" (*De Ver.*, q. 11, a. 1).

[55]"Ad quartum dicendum quod scientia est de aliquo dupliciter: uno modo primo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus, super quas fundatur; alio modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi per reflexionem quandam, et sic de illis rebus, quarum sunt illae rationes, inquantum illas rationes applicat ad res etiam particulares, quarum sunt, adminiculo inferiorum virium. Ratione enim universali utitur sciens et ut re scita et ut medio sciendi. Per universalem enim hominis rationem possum judicare de hoc vel de illo. Rationes autem universales rerum omnes sunt immobiles, et ideo quantum ad hoc omnis scientia de necessariis est. Sed rerum, quarum sunt illae rationes, quaedam sunt necessariae

and intellect, even in scientific knowledge, that the intellect cannot judge perfectly about anything without the perfect cooperation and application of the sense powers.[56] So that, for the human intellect, even its highest natural intellective operations are somehow intimately connected to sense and sense knowledge.

This all too cursory examination of the texts of St Thomas dealing with the mental word in human cognition has revealed at least one point that has relevance for the epistemological evaluation of our experience. Remembering that the psychological account given by St. Thomas started from the experience of knowledge, we should expect that that account would, in a sense, terminate in experience. The causal-metaphysical analysis, in whatever terms it may be couched and however its method may differ from any attempt at the direct description of the knowing experience, ought still to be resolvable into the fundamental moments of that experience.

St. Thomas, speaking in broad terms, distinguishes two moments or functions of the mental word in cognition. The first is that in which the mental word functions as an object of knowledge in itself. This moment, as far as we can judge from this study, is reflective, purely intellective, and related to the data of sense experience only as to the necessary conditions under which intellection can occur, as long as the soul is in the body. The epistemological relevance of this moment for our purposes is small, and it does not concern us here, except as a

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et immobiles, quaedam contingentes et mobiles, et quantum ad hoc de rebus contingentibus et mobilibus dicuntur esse scientiae" (*In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 2, ad 4).

[56]"Judicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur; et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et finis judicii. . . . Manifestum est autem quod non potest esse perfectum judicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignoraret: et similiter non potest esse perfectum judicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur. Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est quod sit in nobis judicium intellectus perfectum, cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus" (*ST*, I, q. 84, a. 8).

We might mention in passing that the same parallel sort of intellect-sense contact and causal penetration is found in the production of artifacts from the *idea*, or exemplar, in the intellect of the maker; the *idea* is none other than the *verbum*. "Alio modo ita quod sit terminus actus intelligendi, sicut artifex intelligendo excogitat formam domus; et cum illa forma sit excogitata per actum intelligendi et quasi per actum effecta, non potest esse principium actus intelligendi, ut sit primum quo intelligatur; sed magis se habet ut intellectum, quo intelligens aliquid operatur" (*De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 2). See also *ST*, I, q. 15, a. 1; *ibid.*, a. 2, ad 2; *ibid.*, q. 44, a. 3; *ibid.*, III, q. 3, a. 8.

demarcation of the second moment. The second function of the mental word is as a means of knowing something outside of itself. In this context, the mental word becomes only a means and in no sense a term of intellectual knowing. It is necessary as a metaphysical prerequisite for the operation, but it is not known in itself. Rather it is merely, or better, purely and simply, that by which the intellect knows the thing.

Thus, in the immediate knowledge of material singulars which characterizes our experience, the immediacy of that knowing is neither interfered with, nor contradicted by, the means, which make this very immediacy possible. In my awareness of things, I am not aware of any object other than the thing. Still, I find that I can understand and think about the intelligibilities which I originally discovered in the thing, when the thing itself is no longer in my awareness. I can also discover, by prolonged reflection and philosophical analysis, that the intellectual operation, which I performed in my immediate perceptual knowing of the thing, required an immanently produced object for that operation in the intelligible order. In both these cases, which are subsequent to, and thus related to, the knowledge of singular things, I can experience and recognize the necessity of the mental word; but in both cases, there is no longer question of my immediate knowledge of an existing thing.

One last point deserves to be mentioned in this matter. Which of the two general functions of the mental word is to take precedence will be determined largely by the direction of the intellect's awareness by attention. At any given moment in the perceptive contact of intellect and sense with a really existing object, the immediacy of my awareness of that object can be disrupted by the unstable focus of my attention.[57] The subtle shift in the focus of awareness away from the real being which is presenting itself and to the intelligible correlates which stand in intentional relation to that real being can dissipate the perceptual

[57]The issues involved in attention, on both the psychological and the epistemological plane, are difficult and crucial. They remain relatively unexplored in regard to the problem of immediacy of perceptual knowledge. Attention can, in general, be object-directed or suject-directed, and in each of these areas, we must recognize multiple degrees of awareness. It is sufficient for our purpose that the subject-object split be recognized.

contact and constitute a completely different noetic context. The more object-directed my attention is, the greater will the immediacy and objectivity of perceptual knowledge impress itself on me. The more subject-directed my attention is, the more will the epistemological immediacy become mitigated.[58]

[58]Knowing what we do about the correlations, on the psychological level, between perception and personality, and with some as yet unscientific suggestions as to the relations between the psychological structure of personality and the realist-idealist inclinations of philosophers, one cannot but wonder whether the ultimate resolution of the questions involving the realist immediacy of knowledge does not lie in the direction of perception-and-personality. Some suggestive work along these lines is reported in *Acta Psychologica*, XIV (1958), 12-23.

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SECONDARY CAUSALITY IN THE *SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES*

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In the introduction to the excellent translation of the third book of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, the reader's attention is directed to three sections of the work which have aroused, or are arousing, controversy or are important in their unsurpassed treatment of certain questions.[1] These are: the famous discussion on the end of man which has led to a number of modern studies; the study of man's desire for the vision of God; and St. Thomas's treatment of moral problems under the precepts and counsels of divine law. Though the study we plan to make is connected with none of these three, our problem is nevertheless one which St. Thomas appears to be at special pains to present in all possible clarity and rigor. The problem is that of secondary causality.[2]

In order to see the Thomistic contribution in respect to secondary causality, the writer intends first to present briefly the thought of St. Augustine in regard to this problem. This is not for the purpose of comparing the two. Such an undertaking would involve more extensive research than is possible in the writer's present circumstances and would transcend the limitations of the *Contra Gentiles*. Since the purpose of this paper is to discuss a problem within a certain text, this additional task will not be undertaken here. Presenting St. Augustine first will serve simply to show the divergence between St. Thomas and other schools of thought under Augustinian influence in regard to this matter.

The mature thought of St. Augustine in reference to proximate causality is best found in the third book of his *De Trinitate*. Book III deals with the nature of the theophanies by which God has revealed Himself to man, whether they were by angels or by specially formed

creatures. Whatever the instrument, St. Augustine says, it is the power of the will of God which reaches to the sensible effects.

In all corporeal change God is the chief cause. St. Augustine adduces the example of the man who contracts an illness after spending himself in some work of mercy. Physicians might err in their discovery of a cause, one saying it was due to too much moisture in the body, the other to too little. Still, this is a pronouncement concerning only proximate causes. Further inquiry into the cause of the dryness reveals the self-imposed toil above which again is the soul of the individual which chose the work. St. Augustine continues:

> Yet neither would this be the first cause, for that doubtless was a higher cause still, and lay in the unchangeable wisdom itself, by serving which in love, and by obeying its ineffable commands, the soul of the wise man had undertaken that self-imposed toil; and so nothing else but the will of God would be found most truly to be the cause of that illness.[3]

Following this, St. Augustine gives a slight foretaste of his theory of knowledge.[4] To show more conclusively his position in regard to the

[1]St. Thomas Aquinas, *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith.* Book Three, *Providence*, Part I, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 18-19.

[2]The writer has chosen to use the *Summa contra Gentiles* for a number of reasons. She wrote her dissertation submitted as a partial requirement for a master of arts degree on the role of analogy in that work. Discovering that it was the analogy of efficient causality which provided St. Thomas a base from which to argue, she confined most of her study to the participation of creatures in being as effects of God. But in the first part of the third book, St. Thomas sees a further participation of creatures in God; namely, in respect to their being causes. The treatment of this had to be sketchy in the previous work, but the writer determined then to study this particular aspect of causality more thoroughly at a later time. This present paper is the realization of that aim.

The reader is undoubtedly aware of the stress laid by some recent writers on the relation of causality to analogy. The *Contra Gentiles*, a work from the middle period of St. Thomas's life, was chosen because of the growing awareness of the importance of this text. Proof for this statement is the new five-volume translation published by Doubleday.

[3]St. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book III, chap. 3, trans. A. W. Haddan, Vol. VII of *The Works of Aurelius Augustinus*, ed. M. Dods (Edinburgh, 1873).

[4]*Ibid.*, chap. 8.

[5]Etienne Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin* (Paris: Vrin, 1929), pp. 263-64.

[6]See Vernon J. Bourke, *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom* (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1945), pp. 206-7. Dr. Bourke concludes: "This tendency to be unsatisfied with anything short of primary causality, as the explanation of events in this world, is a noteworthy feature of the metaphysical viewpoint of St. Augustine" (p. 207).

pre-eminence of primary causality, the Saint avers that some hidden seeds (*rationes seminales*) of all corporeal things that are born visibly are concealed in the material elements of the world. By means of these God's absolute power is imparted to creatures by which they work, applying some operation from without in proportion to the faculties assigned to each by the Creator.

> When one looks at it more closely, this conception of the universe [as stable] appears in perfect agreement with the profound tendencies of Augustinianism. It eliminates effectively all suspicion of any creative efficacy whatsoever in man's activity and in that of other created beings . . . All that they [men] do is to use the intimate and secret forces of nature: *natura id agit interiore motu, nobisque occultissimo.* Whatever may be therefore the causal activity of man, it does no more than apply itself from without to these hidden forces, and it is God who creates from within: *creationem rerum visibilium Deus interius operatur.* From this results a universe, the characteristic aspect of which will be jealously safeguarded by Augustinian tradition. The created active principles scarcely do more than put into play and utilize the creative efficacy of God [*l'efficace créatrice de Dieu*] . . . It is He, in fact, who by His continuous operation up to the present day acts so that the *rationes seminales* deploy their forces and develop from their inmost recesses the visible forms which we contemplate. Instead of drawing the form [*de tirer la forme*] from the passive potency of matter, as do the secondary causes in Thomistic-Aristotelianism, created activities simply bring to light in Augustinianism the effects implanted by God in the *rationes seminales* from the very moment of creation.[5]

According to St. Augustine, any causal explanation which relies solely on secondary causes and which neglects the First Cause of all—namely, God's Will—is incomplete and not ultimate.[6]

St. Thomas plunges into his study of secondary causality after showing that God, who governs all things by His providence [7] and preserves all things in existence,[8] has permitted a further participation of creatures in His being; namely, in respect to their being causes. This is not another application of the analogy of participation as it would be if we were examining the analogy in God's goodness or wisdom as found in the effect. Rather, this is a deeper penetration into the participation of creatures in the very being of God in respect to their being causes.[9]

. . . In Regard to the Reality of Secondary Causality

Because the effect imitates its cause, we can arrive at some knowledge of the cause through the study of the result of its efficiency. All knowledge of natural science is of an a-posteriori nature. If, then, effects are produced directly by God and not by the action of created things, a twofold result would ensue. First, we would be deprived of all this kind of knowledge. The power of a created cause cannot be seen unless the action proceeding from the power terminates in the effect. Since the power of a cause follows upon its nature, that nature cannot be known unless the effect shows forth the power of the agent. If all lower agents are impotent, their nature will remain unknowable. Second, the diversity of effects which we see would not necessarily follow. Heating, for example, is not caused except by the application of fire; and the generation of human beings is directly ordered to a univocal member of the species. The divine power, therefore, does not disregard the activity of the lower agent.[10]

[7] *CG*, III, cap. 64 (Leonine ed. man.; Rome, 1934). (Interchapter numbering corresponds to the translation by Dr. Bourke.)

[8] *Ibid.*, cap. 65.

[9] *Ibid.*, cap. 70 (no. 7).

[10] *Ibid.*, cap. 69 (no. 12).

[11] *Ibid.* (no. 15).

[12] *Ibid.* (no. 16).

[13] Father Klubertanz says: "To limit creaturely causality to accidental change is to derogate from God's excellence instead of enhancing it. For God communicates to His creatures, not only being so that they exist, but also goodness so that they can be the causes of other things. Were this not so, we would have difficulty in showing how God was supremely good" ("Causality in the Philosophy of Nature," The Modern Schoolman, xix [1942], p. 29).

[14] ". . . ita nec forma proprie fit, sed incipit esse per hoc quod compositum sit reductum de potentia in actum, qui est forma" (*CG*, III, cap. 69 [no. 21]).

In connection with this see E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp. 154-89 (especially p. 184).

Affirming the reality of secondary causality enhances, rather than detracts from, God's perfection and goodness. In reference to the former, St. Thomas says that an effect is more perfect in proportion to the perfection of the cause. But God is all perfect; therefore, to detract from His perfection is impossible. If we were to deny any active role in causation to creatures, this would involve a detraction both in the creature and in God. It is the manifestation of the fullness of perfection to be able to communicate to another being the perfection which one possesses.[11]

In respect to goodness, since agents act insofar as they are in act, that which is good makes what is good; and, a fortiori, the highest good makes what is best. Now it is a sign of greater goodness and power to confer something on a number than exclusively on one. But the good of one thing becomes common to many if it can pass from one to the other, which communication can take place only through its own action. So God communicates His goodness so that the creature which receives it can transfer it to another by causing it in that other.[12]

. . . In Regard to the Activity of Secondary Causes

The causality exercised by secondary agents is not restricted to accidental forms but reaches even to the giving of existence.[13] Since to act is the result of a being in act, a more perfect act should not be deprived of action. Now, the substantial form is a more perfect form than the accidental form; and yet accidental forms in material things have their proper action. The disposition of matter in an accidental change is an example of this. Substantial forms should all the more have their proper actions; and since the substantial form of the agent is the source of action, it can be truly said that lower agents cause a thing *to be*. Forms, St. Thomas hastens to add, are not called *beings* in the sense that they possess being; but the composite exists by means of the form. This derogates the positions of form from *that which is* to *that by which the thing is*. Form "begins to be by the fact that the composite is reduced from potency to act, which is the form."[14]

When a lower body acts, it exerts its causality through accidents, those active and passive qualities by means of which its efficiency is

realized. This does not limit, however, their causation simply to producing accidental modifications in others. It is the composite which acts; that is, the substantial form together with matter, and the likeness in the effect is especially to that by whose power the agent acts. As to spontaneous generation such as that observed in putrefaction, the cause there of the substantial form is one of the heavenly bodies which acts as an analogous cause, itself dependent on the Prime Cause. On this lower sphere, for the production of more perfect forms, St. Thomas says the celestial bodies, capable of such an act, must act through the dispositive character of a univocal agent.[15]

Limitation of Secondary Causality

. . . Participated Nature of the Agent in Regard to Being

Secondary causality is limited in that the agent is a participated being. St. Thomas makes this clear in a number of instances. In discussing motion, the Angelic Doctor points out that though all existing things are capable of moving and cannot cause anything except by motion, motion is not a part of the being of the thing. Since the being of anything is participated being, it cannot be the cause of the being of another but only of its being moved toward being. To exemplify the dependence involved in secondary causality, St. Thomas sets up the *a-pari* equation:

$$\frac{\text{the divine operation}}{\text{being of things}} :: \frac{\text{the motion of a corporeal mover}}{\text{becoming and passive movement of the things made or moved}}$$[16]

It is likewise evident that no particular univocal agent can be the unqualified cause of its species. Here the secondary cause can effect other members of the species [17] but not itself. The individual man exists because human nature is present in his particular matter which serves as an individuating principle. When man causes man, he is, properly speaking, the cause of a human form coming to be in this matter. This limits univocal causality of this type to generation. To seek the proper agent of the species is to push the argument back to God, who stands as the first cause, an analogous one, in reference to

[15] *CG*, III, cap. 69 (no. 24).
[16] *Ibid.*, cap. 65 (no. 5).
[17] "Est autem causa hic homo huius hominis, per se loquendo" (*ibid.* [no. 4, init.]).

ıl of creation. The analogous nature of the divine causality obtains in ıe reflection of likeness which the effect mirrors. God then stands : regard to species as the secondary agent in reference to the ıdividual, of which, St. Thomas affirms again, He is the direct cause. ow just as generative action ceases as soon as the generating agent ases, so would the entire species cease if the first cause were to cease s operation.

. . . Participated Nature of the Agent in Its Power as Cause

The common product of all agents is being. Now, several agents ı not produce one result unless they act as one; and this, in turn, nplies subordination to one leader. The example which St. Thomas ives is that of all the men in the army who work to bring about ictory, and they do this by virtue of being subordinated to a leader hose proper end is victory. God alone can properly cause being, nd therefore all other agents must participate in this divine power n order to effect the end.

Too, in all ordered series of causes, what is last in generation and irst in intention is the proper product of the primary agent. For xample, the form of the house which is properly said to be the roduct of the builder comes into effect only after the preparation of ement, stones, and timber, which, in turn, are the proper effects of he lesser workmen. In all action, being is intended. Therefore being s the proper product of the first cause, and all others give being by acting through the power of this principal agent, God.

The order of effects follows the order of causes where the more perfect effect must be attributed to a more perfect cause, and so on in progressively descending degrees. But the first effect is being, and all other effects are only determinations of being. Therefore, being is the proper effect of the principal agent. Whatever else produces being or particularizes or determines being does so only by acting through the power of the first cause.

Fire is the cause of all things that are on fire because whatever is a certain thing by essence is the cause of every participated likeness of that thing. But God alone is His *to be*, and other things are actual only by sharing in His total actuality or participating in His essential

being. It follows that whatever brings something into being does so only by acting through God's power.

Consequences from the Thomistic Doctrine concerning Secondary Causality

Two consequences result from St. Thomas's conclusions regarding secondary causality. First, since all things that act are dependent upon God, He must be everywhere;[18] second, there must be some type of interaction between God and the natural agent to produce any effect.[19]

God's omnipresence follows in the first place since He must be present in all things which He has brought into being from nonbeing. This preservative action of God in reference to being follows from His nature as the fullness of Being.

Secondly, in the case of particular causes and their effects, there is a simultaneity of action such as fire heating through its essence and the soul conferring life on the body through its essence. Wherever being is, God must be since *esse* is proper only to Him. *Being* is predicated of things analogically, and the perfection must necessarily be brought back to the primary analogate.[20]

The same effect can be from God and a natural agent, St. Thomas explains, if we distinguish between the thing itself that acts and the power by which it acts. Ultimately, all power comes from God; so that when a lower agent acts, it produces an effect not only by its own power but also by the power of higher agents. It is even possible to say that the same effect is produced by a lower agent and by God and by both immediately, though in different ways. For the power of the lower agent is not proportionate to the effect produced; and since there cannot be an infinite regress in regard to the powers of the next higher agents, the highest agent is discovered to be the immediate cause of the effect which is also proper to the lower agent. Nor is the effect due partly to the natural cause and partly to the divine action but wholly to both, though in a different way. As we have seen, nothing

[18]*Ibid.*, cap. 68.
[19]*Ibid.*, cap. 70.
[20]See *ibid.*, II, cap. 15.
[21]Etienne Gilson, "Saint Thomas Aquinas," *The Wisdom of Catholicism*, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1949), p. 935.
[22]*CG*, III, cap. 69 (no. 15).
[23]*Ibid.*, (no. 16).

acts except through God's power; yet through the immensity of His goodness He has communicated to His creatures His likeness as a cause so that they, too, can effect an end. There is an analogy here between the secondary cause in its dependence on God and that of an instrumental cause in its relation to the principal agent. The hewn tree is attributed both to the axe which served as the means of cutting and to the woodsman who wielded it and to both wholly.

Conclusion

Every operating agent is the cause of being in some way. Whenever agent causes are arranged in an orderly way, the subsequent cause works through the power of the antecedent causes as lower craftsmen work through the power of the chief artisan. Since God is the first cause, all other causes work through Him and effect being, acting as they do, through the divine power. Since the cause of an action is the one through whose power the action was effected, Holy Scripture attributes the cause of every action to God rather than to the secondary cause, saying through St. Paul: "It is God Who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish according to His good will" (*Phil.*, 2:13).

St. Thomas consistently insists that nature is responsible for its effects. " . . . it would be just as wrong to extol the rights of God at the expense of nature, since, in the long run, God's own glory would have to pay for it." [21]

God is not proved to be great by depreciating the natural order, an Augustinian tendency. There is a greater manifestation of power in creating an effect which in turn can act as a cause than in exercising His creative faculty in each particular instance. Besides the participation in being, the former creative act involves more generosity on the part of God, in that He imparts to creatures some of His perfection as cause, according to their potency to receive it.

Thus for St. Thomas, to withdraw from creatures their proper operations is to detract from the divine power [22] and to disparage the divine goodness.[23]

Loyola University (Chicago) sponsored a symposium on "The University and the Future of America," on May 15, 1958. The role of theology in the future university was treated by the Reverend John Courtney Murray, s.j. Philosophy's task was discussed by the Reverend Martin C. D'Arcy, s.j. (Campion Hall, Oxford) and Professor Paul Weiss (Yale); Professor Eliseo Vivas (Northwestern) commented on the discussion. The role of science was considered by Doctor Paul Klopsteg.

Rosary College and the Thomas More Association jointly sponsored a symposium on "The Catholic Contribution to American Intellectual Life," at River Forest, Illinois, June 14 and 15. The major speakers were: Doctor Karl Stern, the Reverend Joseph Fichter, s.j., Professor Peter Debye, Caroline Gordon Tate, the Reverend Benedict Ashley, o.p., Doctor George N. Shuster, and Professor Jerome Kerwin. Father Ashley spoke on philosophy.

SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN AND JNANA

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INTRODUCTION

Man's existential nature is brought out in the modern definition of him as an "incarnate spirit." For, on the one hand, he finds that the superior part of his nature has something of the infinite; he is capable of assimilating somehow all being without exception by knowledge and love. And on the other hand he realizes, too, his limitations and essential dependence on things and persons; even his body seems to stand in his way of living up to the higher status that is certainly meant for him. In this way, man is like an eagle that would fain soar to the highest heavens but cannot, as he is tied down to earth by a strong rope. We find him from the beginning of history ever seeking for solutions that will make him really "free"; he has thought out and put into practice doctrines varying from crude materialism to spiritual asceticism, from animal epicureanism to sublime mysticism—and this, both in the West and in the East alike.

Even long before Plato was born, the Upanishadic sages [1] were busy finding a way to escape from the bondage of cosmic illusion or ignorance, *maya-avidya*; from their time on, their thoughts and ideas have been guiding the lives of millions in India in one way or another. It is substantially these very ideas which Dr. Radhakrishnan, like the late swami Vivekananda, presents to the modern world as his *jnana* or wisdom. Unlike Samkara, our author likes to call scriptural knowledge *vidya* and to reserve the word *jnana* to designate its essential message, gnosis or spiritual wisdom.[2] He briefly describes it as "intuitive understanding",[3] "realized experience";[4] "cool, clear-sighted vision",[5] "knowledge of Reality",[6] "direct spiritual (integral)

apprehension of the Supreme";[7] and he holds *that* to be the spiritual destiny of man.[8] This "wisdom of the East," because of its strange yet spiritualistic note, seems to come as a solace to many a Westerner who is disgusted with, or unaware of, the traditions of his own past.

Now, just because this spiritual wisdom comes from a clime different from ours or is of a different past, we cannot brush it aside as worthless or erroneous. It is indeed possible that there lurks in it something useless or even harmful; but it is also possible that there is something valuable concealed in it. At any rate, human wisdom, whether of the East or of the West, needs careful and impartial analysis in order that the truth in it may be discerned.

Dr. Radhakrishnan proposes this ancient wisdom of India not only as the *sanatana dharma*, the perennial philosophy of the whole world, but also as a counter to all irreligion or "dogmatic religion" [9] and as the essentials of genuine spiritual experience and interior life. Hence it is that he draws—or at least should draw—the attention not only of students of philosophy but also of all students of religion and the spiritual life.[10]

It is true that a critical study of gnosis in a classical author, in Samkara for example, might have been more fruitful than a critical study of a modern author. Yet the study of the moderns is not without profit, especially when these preserve almost all of the essentials of antiquity. Dr. Radhakrishnan is an author of no mean repute. During the last fifty years he has taught philosophy and religion in various universities; he has been invited to deliver important lectures at home and abroad; he is acknowledged by the English-reading public as one of the chief philosopher-spokesmen of India. While Gandhiji was a "saint," Tagore a poet, Aurobindo an ascetic, it is Dr. Radhakrishnan who is generally acclaimed as the

[1]The earliest and the most important of these lived from the eighth to the fifth century B.C.

[2]S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (1939), p. 24; *The Bhagavadgita* (1948), p. 149; *The Principal Upanishads* (1953), p. 103.

[3]*The Idealist View of Life* (1932), p. 305.

[4]*The Hindu View of Life* (1927), p. 82.

[5]*Eastern Religions*, p. 78.

[6]*Bhagavadgita*, p. 53.

[7]*The Philosophy of S. Radhakrishnan*, ed. P. U. Schilpp ("Library of Living Philosophers Series" No. 8. New York: Tudor Pub. Co., 1952), p. 60.

[8]*Eastern Religions*, p. 94.

[9]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 26.

[10]See the author's *East and West in Religion* (1933).

[11]"Every theory of knowledge, every judgment of value refers and leads us to metaphysics" (*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 816).

[12] Cf. *Idealist View of Life*, p. 301.

philosopher of renascent Hinduism. It is, therefore, worthwhile to scrutinize and evaluate his philosophico-religious gnosis. There is already in existence the valuable work mentioned above, Professor Schilpp's *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.* But unfortunately not one of the twenty-three essays in it seems to consider critically the consistency of Dr. Radhakrishnan's principles and interpretations as a whole. To shed some light, then, on a few points and to offer some correctives to a few others in this otherwise useful inventory of our author's ideas is the aim of this initial study.

Aware of the momentous problems of the present-day world, Dr. Radhakrishnan prefers to discuss ethical principles rather than dwell on ontological truths; yet he himself is quite aware that ethics cannot stand firm unless it is based on sound metaphysics.[11] His interpretation of reality, therefore, is more fundamental and of greater moment than his rules of good conduct. That is why, leaving aside his ethical doctrines, I have concentrated for the most part on their metaphysical foundations.

If there is any originality in Dr. Radhakrishnan, however, it is not so much in his metaphysics itself as in his rhetorical framing of it. For his *jnana* or gnosis is in substance hardly different from the monistic theory of the Vedanta, even though some accidental changes are introduced to give it a semblance of a coherent whole. It is, rather, the impressive way he presents his favorite ideas—and that in terms familiar to readers of Plato and Plotinus, Kant and Hegel, Bradley and Bergson—that from the very start engages the attention of his audience.

I

A

Radhakrishnan's Notion of Religious Experience

Man, says Dr. Radhakrishnan, not only sees the fire that is burning in the hearth, not only infers its presence on the hill from the smoke that is visible there, but also experiences—at least on occasions—the fire of love when face to face with the true, the good, and the beautiful.[12] He has, therefore, not merely a perceptual and conceptual knowledge but

also has, or can have, an "integral" or experiential knowledge of reality.

But what exactly does our author mean by "integral knowledge of reality"? It is not a subjective whim or the morbid views of a psychopathic mind.[13] It is not a shadowy sentiment or pathological fancy fit for cranks and dancing dervishes.[14] It is far from being occult visions, trance, and ecstasy.[15] It is not a sensuous thrill or an emotional debauch.[16] It is neither abstract thought and analysis nor formless darkness and primitive sentience.[17] It is knowledge which is neither superficial nor symbolic nor secondhand.[18] It is not mystical insight or heavenly vision or special revelation obtained through supernatural powers.[19] Nor is it confused irrationalism or irresponsible mysticism. Do not the religious geniuses attest to the "objective" nature of this subject-object-less experience?[20] Is not the experience felt as of the nature of a discovery or a revelation, not a mere conjecture or a creation? The real is there actually confronting us; it is not conjured up out of the resources of our mind.[21] The reality here is indeed of a different, supreme order; but it is not a private fancy or a subjective abstraction in the mind of the knower. It is a real object, *vastuvishayatvac ca.*[22]

This integral knowledge of reality is nonsensuous, nonconceptual, immediate knowledge;[23] it is the most direct and penetrating examination of things possible to human mind, a simple, steady looking upon the real.[24] Different names are given to this higher apprehension, such

[13]*The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* (1920), p. 439. See also p. 90.

[14]Author's article "The Spirit in Man," *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead (1936), p. 487.

[15]*Ibid.*

[16]"My Search for Truth" (offprint, 1948), p. 30.

[17]*Idealist View of Life*, p. 153.

[18]*Ibid.*, p. 145.

[19]*Principal Upanishads*, p. 103.

[20]Cf. "Spirit in Man," p. 494.

[21]*Idealist View of Life*, p. 95.

[22]*Indian Philosophy*, II, 512.

[23]*Idealist View of Life*, pp. 138 and 143.

[24]*Ibid.*, p. 146.

[25]*Ibid.*, p. 128, n. 1.

[26]*The Heart of Hindustan* (1936), p. 8. Cf. also *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 794.

[27]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 792.

[28]*Ibid.*, pp. 792 and 61; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 96. This "complete fusion," however, has its grades.

[29]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, pp. 61 and 792; *Idealist View of Life*, p. 146.

[30]*Idealist View of Life*, p. 138.

[31]*Ibid.*, pp. 45 ff.

[32]Cf. *Principal Upanishads*, pp. 130 f.

[33]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 793.

[34]Cf. *Idealist View of Life*, p. 175.

[35]*Indian Philosophy*, I, 238.

[36]*Eastern Religions*, p. 51; "Spirit in Man," p. 492.

[37]*Indian Philosophy*, II, 674.

[38]"Spirit in Man," p. 492; *Idealist View of Life*, p. 199.

[39]"Spirit in Man," p. 492.

as *prajna, pratibha, arshajnana, siddhadarsana, yogi-pratyaksha.*[25] It is wisdom which is sublimated knowledge, *jnanam vijnana sahitam.*[26] Here, the externality of the individual consciousness to the object is transcended.[27] There is a complete fusion of the subject and object, of the knower and the known.[28] It is knowledge by coincidence or identity;[29] we become one with the truth.[30]

There are, of course, many who argue that they have no such experience of integral or intuitive knowledge. This, explains our author, is due to misapprehension. Have we not all some sense, for instance, of the organic wholeness of things, of the harmony of the world, the trustworthiness of nature, the meaningfulness of life? Have we not all some apprehension of our soul, some intuition of the self? We have all these through intuition.[31] True, while we all have some intuitions of scientific or logical, aesthetic or ethical type, intuitions of philosophical or religious type seem to be beyond the reach of ordinary mortals. But that is simply because these are the perfect mode of integral insight possible here on earth during the cosmic manifestation.[32] Intuition of God is not the only form of it,[33] though that may be the highest form of it.

If intuitive life is the highest range of the mental life of man, spiritual life or religious experience is surely intuition par excellence.[34] If already in the enjoyment of a melody, the contemplation of a work of art, the grasping of the argument as a whole, we have the mystical condition, the sight of God, the experience of reality,[35] we have in the spiritual insight a more vital realization of God, a living, immediate contact with reality.[36] When we contemplate a sunset over the sea or drink in the symphonies of a Mozart, we may be said to catch but the fringe of reality. It is only in a sublime religious experience that we really grasp the very essence of reality and become that reality.[37]

Now, although the religious experience is analogous in some respects to the other higher spiritual activities, it cannot be identified with, or reduced to, any of these or the sum of them.[38] It is unique and autonomous.[39] The difference may be seen from the fact that while the cognitive and aesthetic and ethical sides of our life are only parts, however vital and significant, the religious side includes

them all.[40] This is the transcendent vision of reality, the ineffable experience of a divine presence,[41] "a turning the eye inward and seeing the self." [42] It is not a consciousness of this or that being, but it is to know and to see in oneself the being of all beings, the Ground and the Abyss.[43] It is the state of pure apprehension in which the whole being is welded into one.[44] It is the intuition of all pervading unity of the self and the universe, the mystic realization of the oneness of all.[45]

> Spiritual experience engages our whole person. It is a state of ecstasy or complete absorption of our being. When the flash of absolute reality breaks through the normal barriers of the conscious mind, it leaves a trail of illumination in its wake. The excitement of illumination is distinct from the serene radiance of enlightenment. The human individual, in the contemplative insight, strips himself one after the other of the outer sheaths of consciousness, penetrates to the nerve and quick of his life until he is alone in the white radiance of a central and unique ecstasy. This is the fulfilment of man. This is to be with God. This is to be of God.[46]

This religious consciousness of the sages, *arshajnana*, as distinct from the creative intuition of the genius, *pratibha*,[47] is the highest

[40] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 200.
[41] Cf. *Indian Philosophy*, II, 511.
[42] *Katha Upanishad*, II, 1, 1.
[43] *Indian Philosophy*, II, 512.
[44] *Eastern Religions*, p. 51.
[45] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 125; *Indian Philosophy*, I, 258.
[46] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 63. Ecstasy, however, is not here ecstasy of rapture but of contemplation, as is clear from other sayings of our author.
[47] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 200, n. 1.
[48] *Eastern Religions* p. 51.
[49] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 128; *Indian Philosophy*, II, 510.
[50] *Indian Philosophy*, II, 674.
[51] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, pp. 60 and 69. According to Father Gardeil, we find in St. Thomas *cognitio Dei experimentalis* five times, *quamdam experientiam* twice, and *quasi experimentalis* once (*Revue thomiste*, 1929, p. 272). Anyhow, for St. Thomas real experience of God is always a *donum gratuitum amoris Dei per lumen revelationis vel lumen gloriae* and so cannot be in fitness compared with the natural experience, even if it is mystical.
[52] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 134.
[53] "Spirit in Man," p. 492.
[54] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 61.
[55] *Principal Upanishads*, p. 99. Cf.: "We may dispute about theologies, but cannot deny facts. The fire of life in its visible burning compels assent, though not the fumbling speculations of smokers sitting around the fire" (*Eastern Religions*, p. 23).
[56] *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 793.
[57] *Heart of Hindustan*, p. 13.
[58] Cf. *Bhagavadgita*, p. 43; *Idealist View of Life*, p. 206.
[59] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 206.
[60] "Spirit in Man," p. 493.
[61] *Idealist View of Life*, p. 91.

kind of pure apprehension known to mankind.[48] This corresponds, says Radhakrishnan, to the enlightenment, *bodhi* of Buddha, the illumination, *anubhava* or *avabhoda* of Samkara,[49] the direct intuition, *sakshatkara* of Ramanuja,[50] or even to the *cognitio Dei experimentalis* of St. Thomas Aquinas.[51]

Now, if the necessity of integral knowledge in general for a harmonious life of man is hardly questioned by anyone, man's need for the spiritual mode of it, for the religious experience, is all the more urgent and pregnant with heavy consequences, since a denial of such direct knowledge of the spirit would finally lead to the denial of the fundamental Reality itself. For—but for the constraining authority of experience—it would be difficult for us to be certain of God.[52] Speculative theology can conceive of God as a possibility; it is only religion—which is experience[53]—that affirms God. The divine primordial reality, being a *spiritual fact*, cannot be apprehended either by sense perception or logical inference;[54] it is apprehended for certain only by a spiritual intuition;[55] it is revealed only through inner experience.[56]

And man, continues Radhakrishnan, has not only a remote but an actual and even more or less proximate capacity for experiencing this spiritual intuition. For is there not, at the center of his being, something akin to the Supreme, "a ray of the eternal light emanating from the Central Sun"?[57] This inner, never-extinguishable divine spark can be fanned into a flame under favorable circumstances.[58] When the supreme light in us inspires the intellect, we have genius; when it stirs the will, we have heroism; when it flows through the heart, we have love; and when it transforms our being, the son of man becomes the son of God.[59]

We may think that this is too tall a claim ever to be realized. No, says Radhakrishnan, spiritual experience is not merely possible but is also an undeniable fact. Only because there are persons to whom religious experience is unknown, we cannot say that it is either unreal or impossible; our limited experience is not the standard for all.[60] The experience of many a saint and mystic goes to prove conclusively the reality of the spiritual world. "The evidence is too massive to run away from."[61] For there is a tradition of direct apprehension of the

Supreme in all lands, in all ages, and in all creeds.[62] Buddha and Tao, Krishna and Christ, Moses and Mohammad, Plato and Plotinus, Augustine and Dante, Samkara and Ramanuja, Eckhart and Spinoza, Ruysbroeck and Boehme, Bunyan and Wesley, Ramakrishna and Rabindranath and numerous others[63] testify to the felt reality of God and hence to the fact of spiritual intuition.[64] The subtleties of the schools are all silenced by the protests of the souls who have seen reality.[65]

And we cannot dismiss all these experiences as being due to mental unsoundness or pathological tricks, since some of the greatest mystics have been men of remarkable intellectual power, shrewd discrimination, and practical ability.[66] The fact, indeed, that religious experience has often been confused with emotional thrills and feelings may remind us of the need for careful scrutiny and examination of facts; but we cannot, on that score, throw away the whole body of religious experience as baseless. We are not willing to dismiss sense perception as illusory simply because we have dreams and hallucinations; we continue to rely on our judgments and interpretations of experience, even though they are not infallible. We need not be rude to the experience of God.[67] However much, therefore, we may quarrel about the implications of this kind of experience, we cannot question the actuality of the experience itself.[68] The religious experience may indeed be called exceptional, but only in the sense that all genius is exceptional.[69] For this experience or *anubhava* is open to all, though few attain to it; but the important point is that it *is* open to all. Reality is there, objective, ever present, waiting to be seen by the

[62]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 62. Cf. also Radhakrishnan's *Religion and Society* (1947), p. 47.

[63]The list would be endless; so only the oft-quoted names are given.

[64]Cf. *Idealist View of Life*, pp. 90 f., 95, and 98 f.; *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 69; *Hindu View of Life*, p. 26; *Eastern Religions*, p. 64 and *passim*.

[65]*Indian Philosophy*, II, 512.

[66]"Spirit of Man." p. 493.

[67]*Ibid.*

[68]*Idealist View of Life*, p. 93.

[69]"Spirit in Man," p. 493.

[70]*Indian Philosophy*, II, 513.

[71]*Bhagavadgita*, p. 51.

[72]Cf. *Idealist View of Life*, p. 91.

[73]"*svatassiddha, svasamvedya, svayamprakasa*" (*ibid.*, p. 92).

[74]Cf. "My Search for Truth." p. 29; *Heart of Hindustan*, pp. 49 and 88; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 99; and *Idealist View of Life*, p. 173.

[75]"My Search for Truth," p. 30; *Idealist View of Life*, p. 97; *Indian Philosophy*, I, 177; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 99; and *Heart of Hindustan*, p. 48.

[76]*Idealist View of Life*, pp. 97 and 102.

[77]*Ibid.*, p. 94.

[78]*Eastern Religions*, pp. 28 f.

[79]Cf. *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 63.

[80]*Idealist View of Life*, pp. 98 f.

[81]*Hindu View of Life*, p. 24.

[82]Cf. *Eastern Religions*, p. 29.

individual minds that can seize it.[70] It can be verified by all of us, if only we are willing to pay the price for it.[71]

Now, if the need and fact of religious experience are evident to any unprejudiced mind, the determination, however, of the nature and characteristics of this sublime experience is rather a difficult matter, even according to Radhakrishnan.[72] Self-established, self-evident, self-luminous as it is,[73] it is also quite mysterious and ineffable. Like most decisive experiences of personal life, it cannot be comprehended in exact formulas or expressed in clear concepts[74] but can at best be inadequately communicated to others through hints and images, symbols and suggestions, myths and metaphors.[75] That is why we often picture divine consciousness as a glowing fire, a lucid flash of consciousness revealing itself, and so on.[76] It is this striking feature of ineffability that casts a veil on all our intellectual probings into the intimate nature of the religious experience.

Again, as long as the spiritual experience lasts, the seer remains rapt in contemplation; he has neither the desire nor the power to analyse it. But once the vision ceases, as it must, he strives to recapture and retain it in memory. The process of reflection starts.[77] He represents the self as another with its transcendent majesty. He quakes and shivers, bleeds (*sic*) and moans with a longing gaze at it. He dares not even lift up his eyes. He represents the supreme as the sovereign personality encompassing the whole world, working through the cosmos and ourselves for the realization of the universal kingdom.[78] There is a perpetual disquiet, however, because ultimate Being is not an object and is hardly translatable in abstract ideas and intellectualizations. Reflective accounts, then, are always only approximations.[79]

Besides, in all the accounts of these inspired sages, insists Radhakrishnan, we must distinguish "the given" from the interpreted elements, the simple facts of religion (experience) from the theological preconceptions.[80] And here, what is regarded as immediately given may be the product of inference. For something is directly experienced, but it is unconsciously interpreted in terms of the cultural and traditional ideas and prepossessions of the perceiving mind.[81] While spiritual status is attained by our *ananda*, spirit, it is ever refracted in our *buddhi*, our logical universe.[82] There is no such thing,

then, as pure experience, raw and undigested.[83] For Dr. Radhakrishnan, strictly speaking, there are no experiences which we do not interpret; they are always mixed up with layers of interpretation.[84] It is only a question of degree.[85] Realization, therefore, is a fact; but the theory of reality is always an inference.[86] The intimate nature of reality remains impervious to our minds; all the descriptions we have of it are only "prejudiced" interpretations of the seers.

The philosophical question, then, of the real nature of any spiritual experience is thus ultimately reduced to a question of its interpretation. Now, Dr. Radhakrishnan does not claim to have himself any such experience; and so when he discourses on the nature of man and of ultimate reality, he is but commenting on, and trying to knit together, the various interpretations that have been put forward by others, especially by the Vedantists. Standing, therefore, no longer on the plane of nebulous and ineffable mysticism but on that of consistent and intelligible metaphysics, we are in a position now to examine carefully his interpreted doctrines of the self and of reality.

B

Radhakrishnan's Interpretation of Religious Experience

Sat: The Supreme

According to Radhakrishnan, then, there *is* a Being, *Sat*. The power of this Being, *aseitas*, means that it exists absolutely in virtue of itself,

[83]*Idealist View of Life*, p. 99.
[84]*Ibid.*
[85]*Ibid.*, p. 100.
[86]*Eastern Religions*, p. 23.
[87]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 38.
[88]"In the beginning, my dear, this was just being, one only without a second" (*Chandogya Upanishad*, vi, 2, 2).
[89]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 38.
[90]*Ibid.*, p. 39.
[91]*Ibid.*, p. 38.
[92]*Ibid.*, p. 39.
[93]*Ibid.*, p. 40.
[94]*Principal Upanishads*, p. 63.
[95]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 40.
[96]*Principal Upanishads*, p. 63.
[97]*Ibid.*
[98]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 39.
[99]*Ibid.*
[100]*Principal Upanishads*, p. 63.
[101]*Ibid.*, p. 64; *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 39.
[102]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 39.
[103]*Ibid.*
[104]*Brahman*, derived from the root *brh*, to grow, stands here for the absolute aspect of the Supreme. *Isvara*, from the root, *is*, to dominate, stands for its active aspect. The latter corresponds more to "Lord" than to "God." So *Sat* is *Atman*, *Brahman*, and *Isvara*.
[105]*Principal Upanishads*, pp. 63 and 64.
[106]*Bhagavadgita*, p. 38. Pluralistic universe, for Radhakrishnan, is a universe in which more than one self-sufficient, independent, ultimate reality is admitted, as in the *Samkhya* or *Vaiseshika*. See, for example, *Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 37, n.

requiring no cause, no other justification for its existence except that its very nature is to be.[87] There can be only one such Being, "the Only One, without a second, *ekam evaditiyam*." [88] That is the foundation or ultimate basis of all existence [89] and the ground of all multiplicity; [90] and that is the Divine Spirit.[91] It is absolute or unconditioned as distinct from dependent or conditioned being.[92] This is the Supreme, and it has necessary being; or, more accurately, it is its own being, *svayambhu*.[93] It is perfect and infinite,[94] and so it possesses infinite possibilities.[95]

Atman: Creative Freedom

Now, the power of manifestation is not alien to being; it does not enter it from outside. It is in being, inherent in it.[96] Yet it is not compelled to do so. It is free to move or not to move. It may be active or inactive.[97] Thus this ultimate Being is also pure Consciousness, *Atman*, and unconditioned Freedom.[98] Without any expression or variation,[99] needing nothing and desiring nothing as it is,[100] Pure Being mysteriously moves out of its primal poise so that worlds may spring into existence.[101] Out of the infinite possibilities, it freely wills to actualize one possibility, to realize one world.[102]

Brahman-Isvara: Absolute-God

These are, then, the two sides of the supreme, essential transcendental Being which we call *Brahman*, and Free Activity which we call *Isvara*, the timeless, spaceless reality and the conscious active delight creatively pouring out its powers and qualities; the timeless calm and peace and the brimful joy of activity freely, infinitely expressing itself without any lapse into unrest or bondage.[103] In this conception of *Brahman-Isvara*, or Absolute-God,[104] the first term indicates infinite being and possibility and the second suggests creative freedom and perfection.[105] It is not a question of either an Absolute with an apparent multiplicity or a living God working in a pluralistic universe. The supreme is both this and that.[106] Nay, strictly speaking, it is not even Absolute *and* God; it is just Absolute-God. They are not

two realities, but just one supreme Reality. The distinction between them is only logical.[107]

Trimurti: Threefold Activity

The Spirit, then, Radhakrishnan says, enters into the world of non-spirit to realize one of the infinite possibilities that exist potentially in Spirit. And He creates, sustains, and ultimately resolves the universe. These three aspects of God's activity, these three functions of the Supreme, are brought out by the names *Brahma*, *Vishnu*, and *Siva*, which are not, except figuratively, to be regarded as different persons.[108] During these processes, all His qualities of wisdom, love, and patience find expression and help the fluent world to reach its end. God is spiritual Reality, unconditioned Freedom, and absolute Love.[109] His wisdom and power are sometimes personified as *Siva* and *Sakti*.[110]

Srishti: "Manifestation"

As a consequence of this free choice, therefore, the derived reality of the world ensues from the primary reality of Absolute-God. The universe had certainly a beginning.[111] For, if this world were eternal,

[107]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 796

[108]". . . different names for the fact of God" (*Hindu View of Life*, p. 27). See *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 40, and *Idealist View of Life*, p. 338.

[109]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 41.

[110]Cf. *Principal Upanishads*, p. 64. "This power or sakti is contained in the Supreme as oil in the oilseeds" (*ibid.*, p. 83, n. 1), and Siva and Sakti are regarded as the parents of the universe (*ibid.*, p. 734).

[111]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 44.

[112]*Ibid.*, p. 41; "Spirit in Man." p. 500. A single cosmic process is finite, though indefinite; but, for Radhakrishnan, there are series like this without end.

[113]"Spirit in Man," p. 500.

[114]*Bhagavadgita*, p. 38.

[115]*Principal Upanishads*, p. 63.

[116]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 44.

[117]*Ibid.*, p. 796.

[118]*Ibid.*, p. 797.

[119]*Ibid.*, p. 44; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 71.

[120]*Principal Upanishads*, pp. 61 f.

[121]*Ibid.*, p. 72.

[122]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 44.

[123]*Ibid.*, p. 41; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 65 and *passim*. Rig Veda speaks of *Hiranya-garbha* as the first seed resting on the navel of the Unborn (X, 82). It is the golden germ or egg of the world. Radhakrishnan tries to give it its original meaning. It is at times called "Prajapati" or even "Brahma."

[124]*Principal Upanishads*, p. 61.

[125]*Ibid.*, p. 60.

[126]*Ibid.*, p. 62.

[127]*Ibid.*, p. 72.

[128]*Ibid.*, p. 65.

[129]In the *Upanishads* themselves, the distinction between Isvara and Hiranyagarbha is not sharply drawn; often they are identified.

[130]*Ibid.*, p. 62.

[131]*Ibid.*, pp. 62 and 72.

[132]*Ibid.*

[133]*Ibid.*, p. 72; *Indian Philosophy*, I, 171. Cf. "natura naturans" and "natura naturata."

a dualism of God and the world—where one of them will have a precarious, illusory existence—will result.[112] Creation, in fact, marks the beginning of this world with time, though not in time, since time has no existence apart from events; [113] time derives from eternity and finds fulfilment in it.[114]

This free expression, *icchamatram*, of the Divine mind,[115] this world, is a creaturely being. It exists and continues to exist because, and so long as, God wills it to be. Without the sustaining presence and activity of God, the world would collapse into nothingness. God is indeed distinct from the world, but He is not separate from it.[116] So the Divine is working in the universe,[117] guiding and controlling the concretization of one specific possibility [118].

Hiranya-garbha: The World-Soul in Subtle Form

Now, this freely chosen divine possibility, this particular manifestation of the Absolute-God [119] that is to be realized, specifies the world—so to say "informs" it and indeed forms it as the soul fashions the embryo. In other words, the archetypal idea of God becomes incarnate,[120] becomes the innermost essence of the world,[121] and is regarded as the soul or entelechy of the world.[122] This is, according to our author, the World-Spirit in its subtle form, or the *Hiranya-garbha.*[123] The *Hiranya-garbha*, then, is the first product of the principle of nonbeing influenced by the Eternal Spirit,[124] the first-born of the divine Order, *prathama-ja.* He is the thread, *sutratman*, on which all beings and all worlds are strung like the beads of a necklace.[125] He is organically bound up with the world. Himself a creature, the first-born of creation, he shares the fate of all creation;[126] he is subject to all changes of the world.[127] Though he is sometimes spoken of as "God immanent in this world" [128] and his operations and changes attributed to God Himself,[129] yet, at other times, he is distinguished, by Radhakrishnan, not only from the Absolute but even from God or Isvara, who is prior to the World-Soul [130] and who is not subject to the changes.[131] For Dr. Radhakrishnan, then, as for Samkara and Ramanuja, Hiranya-garbha has a subordinate place and is a created demiurge.[132] He is *karya* or effect-Brahman, as distinct from Isvara, who is *karana* or causal Brahman.[133]

The World-Soul now expresses his spirit through the environment. He manifests the forms within himself. The world is fixed in him as are the spokes in the hub of a wheel.[134] The world is thus the manifestation of Hiranya-garbha and the creation of Isvara.[135] This manifest world is called *Viraj*, or the World-Spirit in its gross form.

Prakriti: "Matter"

This derived reality is a mixture of being and nonbeing, *sat* and *asat*, divine principle and limiting principle, Hiranya-garbha and *prakriti*.[136] This new element, called the unmanifested *prakriti* or primal matter,[137] which is all but cast out from the sphere of being, by itself is more a demand of thought than a fact of existence, since even the lowest existence has received the impress of the Creative Spirit. To call it nonbeing is not strictly correct. This description indicates its distance from being. It is the ultimate possibility on the side of descent from the Divine, almost nonbeing but not utter nonbeing.[138] It is conceived as the objective principle which Isvara uses for creation,[139] or as the darkness of potency that resists and limits the light of actuality.[140]

Jagat: The Cosmos

Although the world and the World-Soul are both equally real, yet they are not eternal but temporal [141] and organically bound up with each other.[142] This dualism, however, of *purusha* and *prakriti*, spirit

[134]*Principal Upanishads*, p. 60.
[135]*Ibid.*, p. 63.
[136]*Ibid.*, p. 90.
[137]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 801.
[138]*Principal Upanishads*, pp. 86 f.
[139]*Ibid.*, p. 86.
[140]Cf. *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 801.
[141]Cf. *Principal Upanishads*, p. 90.
[142]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 801.
[143]*Ibid.*, p. 32. *Purusha* here is synonymous with the World-Spirit, and *prakriti* with chaos or prime matter.
[144]*Principal Upanishads*, p. 81. Cf. *Taittiriya Upanishad*, III, 2: *annam brahmeti vyajanat*—even matter is Brahman.
[145]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 27.
[146]*Ibid.*; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 84. Cf. *Tait. Upanishad*, II, 5.
[147]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 42. The classical notion of karma is thus given a new connotation.
[148]*Ibid.*, pp. 42 f.
[149]*Principal Upanishads*, p. 89.
[150]*Ibid.*
[151]*Ibid.*, p. 80.
[152]*Ibid.*, p. 89. Thomas Merton says something similar: "Everything you love for its own sake, outside of God alone, blinds your intellect and ruins your judgment of moral values and vitiates your choices . . ." (*Seeds of Contemplation*, p. 119).

and matter, cannot be ultimate. The World-Spirit confronted by chaos, or the waters over which the spirit broods, are both expressions of the Supreme Being,[143] since whatever exists owes its being to Brahman.[144]

Samsara: World-Process

The world that is being realized, or *samsara*, is a process of events; and this process is not an incessant fluctuation comparable to a surging sea. It is rather a movement with a direction and goal.[145] During the cosmic process itself we have the successive emergence of the material, the organic, the animal, the human, and the spiritual orders of existence, corresponding to the five satges of *anna*, *prana*, *manas*, *vijnana*, and *ananda* of the *Taittiriya Upanishad*.[146]

Karma: Law of Nature

In the universe there are obviously laws of nature, physical, biological, and psychological. These laws, says Radhakrishnan, are comprehensively designated as *karma*. This karma, however, is not ultimate or absolute. It is but the expression of God's will and purpose. And God is not fate; nor is it an impersonal, abstract, determining power. We are not puppets moved hither and thither by the blind impersonal necessity of omnipotent matter or the sovereignty of divine providence.[147] Human freedom is thus in some sense guaranteed. This freedom of will possessed by self-conscious individuals makes sin and discord possible. These are not willed by the Divine though they fall within His purpose.[148]

Avidya: Ignorance or Worldliness

Man, however, generally speaking, is led away by ignorance, *avidya*. While the world of multiplicity and the world-process reveal to him certain possibilities of the Real, they also conceal from him the full nature of the Real.[149] So he is deluded into thinking that the world is all, that it is self-sufficient, first and fundamental,[150] final and ultimate.[151] And he becomes selfish and wordly.[152] When he is self-willed, he surrenders to the restraint exercised by the play of mechanical forces. He is then victim of karma. But, even then, he

is free to do differently. He can turn his eyes towards the Light in prayer and make an effort of genuine attention to empty his mind of selfish desires and let the thought of the Eternal fill it.[153]

Moksha: Final Realization

Now, man's ultimate aim is to live in the knowledge and enjoyment of absolute values.[154] His duty, therefore, is to dispel the shadows of ignorance, *avidya*, by the radiant light of wisdom, *jnana*. For this process of liberation, or *moksha*, divine providence gives him the means. The material world serves as the *kshetra*, the field or the environment where the individuals, *kshetrajna*,[155] struggle to escape from their alienation, from their slavery to the world, even till the awakening of the Spirit in them all.[156]

There we have a brief conspectus of Dr. Radhakrishnan's metaphysics. Selective and concise as it is, I believe it is an accurate and objective exposition clothed in the very words of our author.

[*To be continued*]

[153]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 43.
[154]*Ibid.*
[155]Cf. *Indian Philosophy*, II, 591.
[156]*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 45.

Rejoinder to Father Henle

VAN CLEVE MORRIS, *Rutgers University*

By way of a post mortem on "L'affaire Columbus" (see "An Experimentalist on Being" and "A Thomist on 'An Experimentalist on Being'" in the January 1958 issue),[1] I can candidly report that Fra Henle has, indeed, nailed me to the mast in a most inelegantly impressive way on a very important epistemological point. I refer to his criticism of my sentence "It is correct to say that the continent was there before he [Columbus] sailed," which appears on page 136, in footnote 6 on page 138, and elsewhere throughout his article. I have been "heisted on me own petard" in that my language was inexcusably inaccurate, a danger I pointed to in laying down the ground rules for intelligent discussion at the outset of my article.

I should have said that no statement can be made concerning the existence of the continent prior to the cognitive contact with it which Columbus and his companions are here dramatically reported to have had. One cannot say that the "continent was there" nor can one say obversely that it was *not* there. To an experimentalist, it is improper to make any ontological predication at this juncture. Some experimentalists, cornered in this way, are inclined to say that the continent had no existence prior to the onset of human (cognitive) relations with it, but this, to me, is no more warranted than what I said. An experimentalist can make no meaningful statement concerning the existence or nonexistence of any "thing" antecedent to his contact with that "thing's" operations, precisely because, as I have pointed out, the definition of that "thing" *is* "its" operations. So I retract, with not a little embarrassment, my phraseological lapse here.

Of perhaps greater moment is the apparent willingness of Fra Henle to make the lurch from cognitive awareness of the *operations* of the continent to a substantive predication of the essential existence—both present and past—of the continent itself. Exactly how this is done psychologically, or—more important—how it is defended logically, continues to mystify the experimentalist metaphysician. That is to say, when all there is to go on are the empirical reports we can generate concerning our contact with hitherto unexperienced relationships in the world—that

is, setting foot on an unknown beach—how can anything we say concerning the existential status of said beach be anything more than a refined and polarized digest of these reports? When we utter, "It is land," we are simply sifting and cataloging the operations we experience into an arbitrary substantive—land. Our use of the word "land" is merely a handy, symbolic shorthand for the many experiences of operations we are now able to report.

It is because of this experimentalist reluctance to "go beyond the epistemological data" into the realm of "ontological existents" that I once again point to my error in language. If there were no experience of the operations of the continent prior to our sailing, then no ontological statement concerning the existential status of the continent can be made. And after these experiences are had, no existential retroactivity is permitted, since existentiality, in this metaphysic, is one with the experience of operations.

I am inclined to be more polemic at this point than my original essay suggested, because I am unable to comprehend how Thomistic ontologists can make existential statements concerning beings they have not yet experienced. If there be a goony-bird on the moon, we shall certainly have to await our experience of it before we make existential comments regarding it. And if, in 1970, we indeed find one there, I do not see what we can say about its existence in 1958. In this sense, Thomistic ontology is *ex post facto*. always contingent upon human awareness as to what *is*. And if antecedent reality must wait upon our experience of it to be defined and *known*, isn't it more prudent not to make such large claims concerning our knowing powers and confine our existential world to that which can be experienced, in the very largest meaning of that much-abused word?

If the nuclear physicists can, through their specialized type of experience, upset the celebrated "Parity Principle," what are we to say concerning the existential cosmos for all those years when they devoutly believed in, and relied upon, said principle? As an experimentalist, I do not see what can be said if one were to stick to Thomistic ontology. To an experimentalist, the physicists simply had "Parity Principle" experiences which they reported and summarized in the principle. Now that they have had new and contradictory experiences, no overhaul of their ontological dicta is required simply because, in their modesty, they refused to make any in the first place.

But, now that all this has been said, I realize how futile the polemic

[1][Van Cleve Morris, "An Experimentalist on Being." The Modern Schoolman, xxxv (1958), 125-33; Robert J. Henle, s.j., "A Thomist on 'An Experimentalist on Being,'" *ibid.*, 133-41. Editor's Note.]

really is, for I have indeed, as Fr. Henle has so vividly metaphorized, attempted "to throw a bridge across the widest section of the chasm." I had hoped in my earlier essay to do quite the opposite—to start "with some sort of crude fact and crude experience which are common to us all," as he has so perceptively said. I started with perception of a physical thing, certainly one of the most elemental grounds of knowing. I tried "to give a philosophical account of [this] common experience . . ." And now I can heartily agree which him that it is here that "we truly make the determining options."

To be more specific, I believe the parting of the epistemological ways occurs after all the perceptions of attributes (Thomistic) and the experiences of operations (experimentalist) have been had. At this point the Thomist digests his perceptions and funnels them into a "being" which accounts for the operations he perceives. We now have an existential being. The experimentalist simply refuses to do this, content with the aggregate of experiences he has had and the meaning he can derive from them.

If we both could, as he says, fix our gaze upon this primary divergence in thought, "hold our restive reflection at this point and attempt to develop a pre-systematic description of the crude facts," I concur with him that this strategy (his "third possibility," [p. 135]) is most likely of all to pay off. The fact that both Father Henle and I have tried our best to do precisely this and have not been notably successful at it certainly attests to his belief, which I share, that this strategy, while most promising, is perhaps the most difficult of all.

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A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas. Based on the Summa Theologica and Selected Passages from his Other Works. **By Roy J. Deferrari and Sister Mary Inviolata Barry, with the technical collaboration of Ignatius McGuiness, O.P. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Five fascicles, 1948-1953. Pp. x + 1185. $62.50, paper bound, folio.**

There is no question of the need for a dictionary of the Latin of St. Thomas Aquinas. The present work is a good attempt to satisfy this need for English readers. The *Lexicon* lists the Latin words used in the *Summa Theologiae*, gives English meanings, and supplies texts from the *Summa* and occasionally from other works to illustrate these usages. It is not a doctrinal concordance. The main utility of the work is linguistic. No attempt is made to list all texts dealing with items of St. Thomas's teaching in theology or philosophy.

English equivalents of Thomistic Latin terms are often difficult to find, as anyone knows who has attempted a translation of St. Thomas. Sister Mary Inviolata, who appears to have done much of the actual work of compilation, was well aware that classical meanings often differ from St. Thomas's usage. In general she has succeeded in finding appropriate equivalents, though it would be easy to suggest improvements for certain technical words. (Those interested in definite suggestions might consult the review of the first two fascicles by A. C. Pegis in *Speculum*, xxv [1950], 261-68.) More use could have been made of technical articles on the vocabulary of St. Thomas, especially those by French scholars such as Blanche, Chenu, and Wébert. In my judgment, the *Lexicon* is more useful to beginners in Thomistic Latin than to experts who might wish help on a particular usage.

The Leonine edition was used for the *Summa Theologiae* and the Vivès printing for all the other works. Unfortunately, the technical assistance given Sister Mary Inviolata does not seem to have extended to information about authenticity. Many works used as additional sources of St. Thomas's usage were not written by Aquinas. More than ten works listed in the *Key to Abbreviations*, and quoted occasionally in the listings, are simply not authentic. (See, for instance, the lengthy text on *usura* from the notoriously spurious *De Usuris*.) Other writings are of such doubtful authenticity that no informed scholar would cite them without warning.

Still other works are commentaries begun by St. Thomas and finished by various other writers. The non-Thomistic portions should not be used in a lexicon such as this. A special problem is presented by the *Supplement* to the *Summa*, which is cited continually. Someone compiled this *Supplement*, after St. Thomas died, by selecting pertinent passages from his *Scriptum in IV Librum Sententiarum*. Citations from the *Supplementum* should be credited to the work in which St. Thomas wrote them; namely, the *Commentary on the Sentences*. This illustrates another deficiency of the *Lexicon*. It pays utterly no attention to chronological changes in Aquinas's vocabulary. There is, for example, the noted case of the use of *bonum* with a greater extension than *ens* (in the *Summa contra Gentiles*) and the subsequent correction of this usage (in the *Summa Theologiae*).

In one sense, the timing of this *Lexicon* was unfortunate. During the period after World War II, when Sister Mary Inviolata was working, many critical editions and new translations of separate works of Aquinas were published. In 1945, the decision to use the Vivès printing may have been partly justifiable, though even then there were better texts for many of the works. However, it is now clear (to give but one illustration) that an adequate treatment of the term *separatio* requires some attention to the critical editions of the *Commentary* on Boethius's *De Trinitate* (the incomplete edition by Father Wyser and the complete one by Bruno Decker). This is not a criticism of Sister Mary Inviolata; she did not have these editions when she started her work. Yet the comment shows that some revision will be necessary within a few years, because texts superior to, and correcting, the readings of the Vivès edition are coming out all the time. Indeed, it is well known that some of the early volumes of the Leonine *Summa Theologiae* will eventually require revision.

Another development is the work in progress under the direction of Father Busa. His project is to list all the usages, in all contexts, of all terms, in all the works of St. Thomas. This work is being carried on now in a way which Sister Mary Inviolata could not hope to match. She worked by much the same methods that glossators of the fourteenth century used. Father Busa's methods are those of a nuclear age. His material is clipped from printed texts, recorded on millions of punched cards, and manipulated by computing machines made available by the I.B.M. Company. What such mechanical techniques will produce is difficult to say, as yet. But surely Sister Mary Inviolata could not have realized at the beginning of her arduous task that she would end in competition with Frankenstein's monster!

The upshot of this review is this: *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas* belongs in all libraries that have a budget sufficient to purchase it.

(Librarians may note that this *Lexicon* is *not* identical with the *Complete Index of the Summa Theologica*, by the same compilers, published in one volume in 1956.) There is no other dictionary like the *Lexicon*. If it is eventually revised, or replaced, that prospect is something for the distant future.

CELESTINE J. SULLIVAN, JR., *University of California*

The Mind of Santayana. **By Richard Butler, O.P. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955. Pp. xiv + 234. $4.00.**

On September 26, 1952, George Santayana died in Rome. Thus came to an end the life of one of the most interesting and most enigmatic of modern philosophers. This man and his philosophy, I dare say, will prove of perennial interest to students of philosophy *per se* and of the mind of man, its creator.

Father Butler, the author of *The Mind of Santayana*, is quite cognisant of this dual appeal of Santayana to the student of philosophy, the dual appeal of the man and his work. Father Butler's book is primarily concerned with the work, not, however, without due recognition of the man and the influence of his subtle personality on the nature and structure of his philosophy. In fact, it is his picture of the man that is one of the most appealing things about this work; and I would recommend it in the first place for this, its secondary interest. Father Butler had the good fortune to have two years of close association with Santayana's person, and his evaluation of the influence of this person on his doctrines alone makes this book well worth the reading.

Concerning Santayana's philosophy as such, Father Butler's work is divided into two parts, exposition and criticism. The expository part deals primarily with the nature of essence, as this appears in the *Realms* books and *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. As Father Butler says,

> I have concentrated upon the notion of essence, as described in these particular volumes, on the recommendation of Santayana himself. Here, he insisted, his mature philosophy is contained and best expressed. All that preceded was a preparation and development; what followed was a consequence and application (p. 59).

A chapter is devoted to a review of Santayana's favorite approach to essence through skepticism. The defining characteristics of essence, positive and negative, according to Santayana are then passed in review. In concluding this chapter Father Butler says: " . . . I would venture, in my

own terms, a definition of Santayana's notion of essence: *the quiddity of any being whatsoever.* We can elaborate that definition by adding: *without reference to any status: possible or actual, ontological or logical, physical or ideal, conceptual or eventual, simple or complex"* (p. 87). This, I think, is a good summary statement of Santayana's notion of essence.

The next chapter, on essence and existence, is given over principally to a presentation of Santayana's account of matter as substance. As Father Butler points out, Santayana's materialism is a basic presumption in his whole account of existence. No attempt is made on his part to substantiate his position. It is simply assumed as a basic article of his animal faith. Having thus been presumed, however, it is then consistently stated dogmatically as though it were matter of fact.

Santayana supposes that essence has a dual status with respect to existence, as the nature of the material world and as it appears in the mind. Concerning the latter, Father Butler is most interested in the role of essence in cognition. On this question he observes that

> Santayana separates and does not merely distinguish *that which* is known and *that by which* something is known. This division cuts even deeper, as we shall see. The ideal and the real are utterly and irreparably disparate. . . . This marks a fundamental division and total separation between the realm of essence as the mind internally participates in it, and the realm of matter, which is encountered externally in action (pp. 104-5).

Hence the paradoxical conclusion on Santayana's part that knowledge is faith, a salutation, not an embrace. Further, essences intuited and essences exemplified in the material world are very likely essentially disparate and in any case existentially so; nor is it possible to know whether they are essentially the same or not (pp. 107-9). One might wonder, then, how we know that this is unlikely. Father Butler rightly observes that, for Santayana, "we must close our eyes to the chasm that lies between essence and existence and straddle the gap as we work our way through the world blindly—by 'animal faith' " (p. 118). It is not only that we are confined to ideas, not things; even the existential side of ideas escapes our grasp. Only essence remains immediate. And as Father Butler points out in the concluding chapter of the expository part of his book on "the primacy of essence," essence is primary for Santayana not only ontologically and epistemologically but morally and aesthetically as well.

> The notion of essence, defined according to his own epistemological and materialistic prejudices, is the foundation stone of Santayana's

whole system of philosophy. And in the last of the realms of being which he treated, that of spirit, he developed a moral and aesthetic way of life that culminates in a naturalistic contemplation of essences for their own sake (p. 119).

Father Butler opens the critical part of his work with an attack on skepticism in general, a seemingly appropriate opening, since Santayana claims to establish his separation of essence from existence by a thorough-going skepticism—indeed, more thorough-going than that of Descartes or even Hume. However, it would have been well, I think, had Father Butler considered closely the steps of Santayana's reasoning in *Scepticism and Animal Faith* leading up to his conclusion that "nothing given exists." A criticism directed specifically against the course of this reasoning might at the same time have exposed the weaknesses of skepticism in general and Santayana's particular exemplification of it. That absolute skepticism is self-defeating and warrants no conclusions at all of itself does not specifically indicate why Santayana's conclusion from a skeptical line of reasoning that "nothing given exists" is unwarranted.

In what perhaps might be called ontological criticism as distinct from epistemological criticism, Father Butler comes more specifically to grips with the faults of Santayana's separation of essence from existence.

> He [Santayana] has come to the "important conclusion" that the datum—a discovered essence—"does not exist." Santayana has jolted his critics with this proposition. But the conclusion need not be shocking at all. Although important, it is not remarkable; for, properly understood, the statement is true.
>
> Essence does not, indeed cannot, really exist apart from the act of existence. For together they are entitative parts of every real being. Although these co-principles are really distinct in all creatures, they are not and cannot be separated but only distinguished. But, because they can be distinguished intellectually, an even bolder assertion can be made by saying that existence does not exist, an observation made nearly five hundred years ago by Cardinal Cajetan, St. Thomas's principal commentator. He pointed out that existence is exercised as a principle of real being and signified in the apprehension of a quiddity; and this signification can be considered logically as a distinguishable something.
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> Actually, although really distinct in contingent beings, essence and existence in real being are not separable since they unite to make being *be*. Even an abstracted essence merely takes on a new (intentional) mode of existence in the intellect, without losing its physical existence in the substance from which it is drawn and

always signifying it. Being is what comes first to the mind and always remains. The mind can focus on essence, obscuring its relation to existence, but cannot abstract existence from essence, since existence is not a form but the act of all forms (pp. 159-60).

The above is very cogent criticism of Santayana's separation of essence from existence, not, however, of how this separation is supposedly established by skeptical means. But I do think that it is well indicated here that such a separation cannot be established in any manner at all, for essence, as Santayana understands it, is not some being but *what* a being is. Santayana not only multiplies entities, considered here as separated beings, beyond necessity, but he multiplies them also beyond consistency, for what is first considered as the quiddity of something cannot also be considered as another thing itself in addition to that of which it is the quiddity.

> The being first apprehended by the mind is real being, not a logical entity resulting from a review of the primitive datum. St. Thomas points out that existence precedes essence logically, in that the mind grasps the notion of essence by its apprehension of the essence of some existing thing. We cannot, strictly speaking, abstract existence from the essence grasped, for existence is not a form but the act of all forms, and is necessarily consignified even in the simple apprehension of essence.
>
> In this apprehension the essence does not lose its existence; in fact it cannot; it merely takes on a new status of existence, intentional existence, in the mind, and real existence is thereby signified. We can refer back to this intentional existence by a second consideration of the mind; but to ignore existence altogether is, while possible, an altogether artificial, mental side-stepping, which achieves not the being of a second intention, proper to logic, but a being of third intention, a chimera, indeed "ghostly" and "inert" because it is dead—this is Santayana's notion of essence (p. 171).

It remains to point out that Father Butler claims—rightly, I believe—that Santayana's whole philosophy, while skeptical in intent, is dogmatic in fact, being based upon two inconsistent dogmas, essentialism in theory of knowledge and materialism in metaphysics; and never do the twain meet. Santayana is quite frank, to be sure, about his dogmatism in metaphysics. His materialism is confessedly only an object of his "animal faith," though at every turn he gives the reader the impression that to believe differently is foolish if not impossible. Yet he combines such a dogmatic materialism with the shadowy Platonism of his doctrine of essence, something as paradoxical, for example, as Democritus composing

the myth of the cave or Socrates confessing in the *Phaedo* that the body outlasts the soul. As Father Butler points out, there is no bridge for Santayana across this gap between Platonic idealism and Democritean materialism; but I would further observe that, in this strange combination, while nothing is gained something is indeed lost. The Platonism is emasculated, for the essences do not exist; and the materialism, confessedly irrational, has lost all appeal to rational men. How appropriate, then, is Father Butler's concluding quotation from Santayana's *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*, from which I excerpt the last two sentences: "We are as innocent as the fig tree. Nevertheless it is quite possible that on the morrow we may be found withered" (quoted on p. 195).

WILLIAM W. MEISSNER, S.J., *Woodstock College*

The Character of Man. **By Emmanuel Mounier. Trans. Cynthia Rowland. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. Pp. x + 341. $6.00.**

The Character of Man stands as a monument to the memory of one of the most vital and stimulating intellects of the contemporary rejuvenation of French Catholic thought. Up until the time of the publication of this work in its original edition, Mounier's efforts had been characterized by a certain chaotic determination. He was a prophet, whom one had to hold at once in terrible awe and feverish recognition. To this work, however, Mounier added a touch of science and of system, which, combined with the poetic and intuitional force of his thinking, provides us with a provocative manifesto. One regrets the unfulfillment of this departed giant.

The book is the more remarkable in that the French edition first appeared in about 1943—contemporaneous with Sartre's *L'Etre et néant*. The Sartrean atmosphere, as in Mounier's other publications, is unmistakable, but it is no more than an atmosphere. The keynote here is revolt. The orientation and dynamism are personalism, the fierce crusading personalism that cried out with the cry of courage against despair in the pages of *Esprit*. It breathes the spirit of Bergson, Péguy, Kierkegaard the optimist, and Adler at his misunderstood best. Through the whole discussion, Mounier's basic concern is with commitment: commitment to self, commitment to truth, commitment to action. "In the confusion of all values, he must choose firmly all that it means to be a man, and a man of his time: then will it with daring, linking imagination with his fidelity. We have chosen. This study is not solely a study of man: it is a struggle for man."

As a scientific study (and it is fundamentally a treatise in psychology), *The Character of Man* never reaches the point of systematic theory. Even

so, it provides an intuitive and comprehensive (not to mention refreshing) account of modern French psychological thought. Using the characterology of Heymans and Wiersma, which is little known and less admired in American psychological circles, Mounier draws together a vast amount of empirical data and reinterprets several major theoretical orientations and subsumes the whole under the aegis of his dynamic personalism. The result is systematic but not a system. It is the probing of a pioneer spirit, and what is new deserves the commitment to confirmation and verification. Gripping and ringing with conviction though it may be, the psychologist is required to wade more slowly in his methodological hip-boots.

We must applaud the appearance of this English translation. Much of the radical development in phenomenological psychology and psychiatry on the European scene has remained closed to American thought. Mounier's work deserves to be better known on this side of the Atlantic, for it has been received with enthusiasm and devotion in his native country. The developing insistence from thinkers like Mounier on one side and the existential analytic theorists on the other on the positive and dynamic aspects of the person and the imperative of personal commitment and engagement might well provide a badly needed pick-up to a lagging behaviorism.

DESMOND J. FITZGERALD, *University of San Francisco*

The Age of Adventure: The Renaissance Philosophers. **Selected with introd. and interpretive commentary by Giorgio de Santillana. New York: Mentor Brooks, 1956. 50¢**

The Age of Ideology: The 19th Century Philosophers. **Selected with introd. and interpretive commentary by Henry D. Aiken. New York: Mentor Brooks, 1956. 50¢.**

The "Mentor" series has served teachers of philosophy by publishing selections from the classic thinkers from the Middle Ages to the present in inexpensive, readily obtainable paperbound editions. These volumes continue this service both in the passages chosen and in the thoughtful interpretations.

Santillana, professor of the history of science and the philosophy of science at M.I.T. and author of the dramatically written *The Crime of Galileo*, the reviser and annotator of the Salusbury translation of Galileo's *Dialogue on the Great World Systems*, leisurely expresses the many-sidedness and dynamic diversity of the Renaissance thinkers in his introductory essay. Rather impressed with variety for its own sake, Santillana

nevertheless presents the reader with aptly chosen passages which range from Nicholas of Cusa, da Vinci, More, Machiavelli, Erasmus, Luther, Durer, Michelangelo, Copernicus, Montaigne, Paracelsus, Kepler, Boehme, Galileo, and Hakluyt to Giordano Bruno. As the list implies, none of the readings is lengthy, varying from a few pages to over twenty pages for Montaigne and Bruno (in view of Santillana's expert knowledge, the Galileo selection, less than ten pages and of minor significance, was somewhat disappointing). However, it would seem that some effort was made not to duplicate the individuals presented in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man* (Cassirer, Kristeller, and Randall); along with it, this Mentor book provides an excellent companion to Copleston's *Ockham to Suarez* or background reading for the opening chapters in Collins's *A History of Modern European Philosophy.*

Aiken's introductory essay on the background of the nineteenth-century philosophers and his remarks before each selection provide a succinct and excellent preparation for coming to grips with the essential elements of each philosopher's position. In an urbane, sympathetic, and clearly written fashion, Aiken leads the reader from a section out of Kant's *Prolegomena*, through Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Comte, J. S. Mill, Spencer, Marx, Engels, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard to Ernst Mach, carefully tracing the reactions and developments which took place in that century. Aiken is very positive in his treatment of each man, attempting to point out some significant contribution each has made. Then in a "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," Aiken reveals something of his own hopes for philosophy.

Calling for a re-evaluation of the age of ideology and its contribution to contemporary thought, Aiken nevertheless is critical of those who would wish to return to some past thinkers' principles today. The past is past, he argues, and the critique of reason which must be undertaken today cannot involve the re-establishment of any past metaphysical synthesis. Instead, we receive from philosophy some satisfactory world-view which gives coherence and meaning to our life.

"The fundamental business of metaphysics . . . is not a description of the nature of things, but the formulation of a coherent world-view, adequate to the conduct of life," Aiken writes of the idealists, and it sums up fairly well his own theory of metaphysics. Whether a metaphysics is scientifically true or false is unimportant, Aiken says, speaking for himself. "What does matter is that the pictures of reality which they present to us may enable us to organize our energies more adequately for the satisfaction of our total needs as men."

Again this selection will serve as a handy undergraduate complement

to Collins's text or as an introductory guide to the further study of the nineteenth-century philosophers.

LEONARD A. WATERS, S.J., *Creighton University*

The Contemplative Activity: A Study in Aesthetics. **By Pepita Haezrahi. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1956. Pp. 139. $3.00.**

The Contemplative Activity is a series of eight closely-reasoned lectures with the purpose of isolating the aesthetic act as distinct from, and underlying, all human activity in art. It is thus, in a neat paradox which the title catches, a simple, initial act of receptivity, of sensitivity upon which the total artistic activity is built. This total act will contain the judgments, knowledge of art history, refinements of taste—in short, all that can be taught about art by precepts—but nothing whatsoever will take the place of the primary act, "the contemplative activity," upon which all is built.

Dr. Haezrahi here achieves, in admirable English, a synthesis in which such disparate aesthetic concepts as intuition, organic unity, disinterest, the hierarchy of sense and rational faculties, and aesthetic distance are marshaled and organized in accordance with a thorough grasp of her subject. Her work is frankly Kantian in origin and inspiration but with careful and necessary adjustment to today's psychological and anthropological knowledge. The refuge of subjectivism, in fact, seems a little strange in Dr. Haezrahi's synthesis, coming after a full and sensitive analysis of the "object" as in every sense real and existent previous to the act of the mind. This monist will-o'-the-wisp is felt particularly in her analysis of form and the work of the imagination, and yet her final summary is so wise and realistic that one can only admire the author's taste and training.

Unfortunately, she handles the relationship between the aesthetic and the moral in art with a taint of the old, old prejudice that the moral is, after all, irrational. A moral "faculty" is set up gratuitously—one that is in no deep way integrated with the aesthetic or even intellectual response to art. This is "faculty psychology" of the modern variety and not harmonious with the author's, and our deep and abiding admiration of the unified, organic, unique human response which initiates all aesthetic activity.

JOHN W. DONOHUE, S.J., *Fordham University*

A Catholic Philosophy of Education. **By John D. Redden and Francis A. Ryan. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1956. Pp. xiii + 601. $4.75.**

Education for Maturity. **By Frederick Mayer and Frank E. Brower. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Pp. vi + 155. $3.25.**

Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of Education. **By Theodore Brameld. New York: Dryden Press, 1956. Pp. xiv + 417. $4.50.**

These are three contributions to the philosophy of education, a flexible category which has historical antecedents but is, to a great extent, a twentieth-century hybrid. Books in this field are often designed as classroom texts; and they make a sustained effort to relate a generalized discussion of the aims, curricula, methods, and agencies of education to a complete philosophy of the real, of life, knowledge, and value. In a day when philosophy in the university world is generally highly specialized if not absorbed in linguistic problems, ventures of this sort are a survival of an older enthusiasm for the construction of synoptic world-views. It must be admitted, however, that the expansion and complexity of technical philosophical erudition inevitably make the more spacious enterprise appear somewhat shallow. Most philosophies of education, indeed, besides amalgamating material drawn from the behavioral sciences with their speculative reflections, rarely engage the strictly philosophical discussions at that level of profundity which the academic philosopher has come to expect. Still, they do try to provide an intellectualization of the crucial feelings and questionings actually preoccupying modern man; and perhaps to some extent they make up in range and relevancy for what they lack in subtlety and depth.

The works examined here fall neatly into a conventional sort of pattern, disposing themselves, so to speak, from north to south through center. One is projected from the base of Catholic Christianity and another from that of instrumentalistic naturalism. As respectively formulated, these two positions are made to seem, perhaps, even more totally antipodal than may be necessary. Certain value responses, at least, are common to both the Scholastic and pragmatic schools, even though the philosophical analyses are often in fundamental conflict.

A Catholic Philosophy of Education, by John D. Redden and the late Francis A. Ryan, is a revision of a well-known and widely used text which first appeared in 1942 and is still the most comprehensive statement available. The new edition is substantially unchanged. Some short passages have been interpolated; the order of the chapters has been slightly rearranged, and the bibliographies have been brought up to date. The

materials are divided into two parts for a full year's course, but they can be easily adapted to a one-semester program. The first twelve chapters outline the authors' philosophy under such familiar rubrics as those of child nature, aims and agencies, intellectual, religious, moral, aesthetic, and physical education. The second half is largely taken up with detailed —if highly critical—summaries and evaluations of such competing humanisms as those of socialism, nationalism, Communism, and experimentalism. The final pages discuss "Education for Democracy." The virtues of completeness, clarity, and sobriety which characterized the first edition remain here undiminished and will, no doubt, continue to recommend this text for use in Catholic institutions.

In 1950 Theodore Brameld published *Patterns of Educational Philosophy*, a rather unwieldy work of over eight hundred pages having the same sort of ground plan of critical and constructive sections as Redden and Ryan employ. In *Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of Education*, Brameld has reworked and reissued the second half of that earlier book and has compressed the main points of his negative critique into a "prologue." The philosophy of reconstructionism which he expounds is, in its metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, essentially the thought of Dewey but somewhat hardened. For the single-minded devotion to problem-solving by scientific method and to constant planning for goals always provisional is here supplemented by emphasis on the features of a "planned" society and by commitment to certain preferred solutions which have resulted from the problem-solving thus far. The inspiration, however, quickening what Brameld calls "the utopian proposals of reconstructionism" in the political order, owes a good deal to Marxian humanitarianism.

Besides a theoretical argument, this revision contains concrete proposals for school practice which are reminiscent of the "life adjustment" programs that flared up and out some years ago. These recommendations are often the index of a commendable zeal for the development of initiative and responsible freedom; but they are also quite vulnerable, since they are heavily laced with the more exotic kind of progressivism which, in the current climate of international scientific rivalries, is simply apt to arouse public indignation. In any event, students of philosophy will be more concerned with the speculative substructure on which these suggestions are made to rest. From this point of view, Brameld's book should prove interesting since it enunciates, without much nuance, naturalistic theses which are nowadays generally expressed more circumspectly. It is stated firmly, for example, that the entire universe contains no more than the world within reach of scientific experimentation, that the goals of history depend wholly upon human choices, that both truth and values are established by social consensus, and that a

philosophy like Thomism is not only profoundly regressive in character but also destructive of democratic life and thought.

Those who find reconstructionism unacceptable (a footnote suggests that their company includes Communists, Catholics, and Republicans) will be prompted to observe that theories of this sort absolutize their own ideals —Brameld's social self-realization, for instance—while denouncing other people's absolutes. Christian thinkers may, however, find two other lines of inquiry more instructive. One might at least ask whether the reconstructionist's hostility towards many values widely honored in Western tradition indicates some deficiency in exposition or communication on the part of those who would defend these values. It is also worth noting that instrumentalists do try to spell out an educational theory which will give form and direction to certain movements in the modern world which in themselves are quite admirable. The impulse toward political democracy or toward world community are cases in point, and one wonders if Christian philosophies of education have reflected on such matters as fruitfully as they might.

Messrs. Mayer and Brower, the authors of *Education for Maturity*, have excellent intentions. Like all philosophers of education, their basic orientation is ethical; and they would like in their book to distil the wisdom of the past and present, and relate it effectively to moral goals. In practice, however, no real synthesis emerges but only a succession of apothegms and high-level generalizations which exhaust the reader and leave him clamoring for more penetration and more distinctions. But if this eclectic project fails, it does at least point a salutary warning, for it demonstrates how difficult, indeed, is the plotting of any *via media*.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

Das Urteil und das Sein. **By Johannes B. Lotz, S.J. Pullach bei München: Verlag Berchmanskolleg, 1957. Pp. xxiii + 218.**

Father Lotz's book was first issued in 1938 under the title of *Being and Value*. In this new edition, some sections are rewritten and some explanatory notes added. These notes are useful for readers who may want guidance in the correlation between Thomistic problems and current terminology. The new edition also contains a long appendix, which replies to earlier critics and makes an analysis of Heidegger on truth and judgment. Since the book was not widely reviewed in America upon its original appearance, a brief account can be given of its argument.

During the nineteen-thirties, Lotz took several seminars with Heidegger and encountered the same problem confronting any theist, that Heidegger

confines being to the finite order and hence has no room in philosophy for God. With the aid of his studies in Aquinas and Maréchal, Lotz sought a rational way of making philosophical statements about God. He returned to the Thomistic doctrine on the transcendentals, which he viewed in the new perspective of their being expressed in judgments. Stress was placed on the relation between being and activity or operation. Since activity can consist in representing and in desiring or striving, this emphasis views being as the common root for the true and the good.

Transcendence concerns the relation between any particular thing-that-is and being itself. As a general relation, it is found in every such particular, since each thing-that-is is enlivened by being. But Lotz treats man as the special locus where transcendence occurs, since man can become aware of the bond between the things-that-are and being. Human knowledge, especially human judgment, is the proper home of transcendence. Judgment recognizes that being is not a genus and that neither the judging subject nor any finite object fully realizes the perfection of being itself. Hence the judgment posits that being itself is supercategorical and superfinite. Reflection on the kinds of beings leads us to make the distinction between the subsisting being and every finite participant in being. At the same time, this act makes a man fully aware of himself and of his relation of striving toward the subsisting being of God. This striving is achieved by way of knowing and loving, thus carrying out in the active order the ultimate significance of the judgments about the transcendentals and, indeed, every judgment as embodying an unconditional *is*.

In an appendix to this edition, the author defends his position against the charge of ontologism and clarifies its relation to Heidegger. Lotz subordinates pre-predicative openness to predicative truth, but in such a way as to open the route for the superpredicative truth of being. The undetermined dynamism of being is not only present factually in the judgment but is present there as manifesting the dynamism of the purely actual being. Hence Lotz departs from Heidegger in viewing human freedom not as an absolute but as a striving for union with the superhuman, subsisting being of God. Moreover, the history of philosophy is not just a wandering away from the meaning of being but keeps a positive reference to it. The chief problem raised by this book is the same as that raised by Maréchal's work: Can the human judgment validly affirm the being of God otherwise than through a causal inference, as far as philosophical method is concerned?

CHARLES FAY, *Assumption University.*

Introduction to Logic. **By Andrew H. Bachhuber, S.J., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957. Pp. xiv + 332.**

Father Bachhuber points out in the preface that this subject matter is typical of manuals of Scholastic logic. The content of such a textbook is perfectly familiar: the three acts of the mind, the standard rules of inference, fallacies, division of terms, concepts, propositions, categories, predicables, and so on.

Unlike many Scholastic texts that have been hastily put together, this book has been carefully written from the point of view of the learning problems of undergraduates. Teachers who strive to develop the art as well as the science of logic will appreciate the order of presentation. The first half of the book covers the formal logic of immediate and mediate inference with a minimum of psychological and epistemological detail; the latter are covered in the second half, together with some of the intricacies of term, concept, and proposition. An appendix contains a chapter on symbolic logic and a sample multiple-choice test. This arrangement of subject matter enables the student to learn the rules early in the course so that ample time is available to apply them in exercises.

The first half of the book is a self-contained unit; this is an advantage in courses which combine logic with an introduction to philosophy. The book lends itself admirably to the requirements of a variety of courses.

The chapter on induction is an excellent introduction to the different kinds of induction employed in philosophy and the empirical sciences. Throughout the book, Father Bachhuber makes use of the type of induction which presents the necessary truth of the universal by affording insight into particular cases. Instances of the violation of rules are presented, and the student is encouraged to grasp by insight why the sequence is invalid. Then the rules are presented which capture and preserve this insight. The pedagogical and scientific value of this procedure is obvious.

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A Christian Philosophy of Life. **By Bernard Wuellner, S.J., Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. ix + 278. $4.25.**

Since philosophy springs from truths knowable without revelation it would seem to lose its identity by fusing with the latter. There are, however, many truths about human life that are well within the province of philosophy but which philosophy never suspected until revelation called

attention to them, as is attested by the pagan Stoics after the advent of Christianity. Father Wuellner does not "don the chiton of Aristotle or the toga of Cicero" but rather the modern academic gown that is worn becomingly in the halls of both philosophy and theology. The theme of his book is well compressed into one sentence quoted from Pope Pius XI: "The product of Christian education is the supernatural man who thinks, judges and acts constantly and consistently in accordance with the principles of right reason and the enlightening example and teaching of Christ" (p. 121). In other words, philosophy and theology each allows itself to be pervaded by the light of the other. To see whether this can be done, the skeptical reader would perhaps turn to the chapter on the problem of suffering and Christ's contribution to its solution. In this test case Father Wuellner's fusion comes off rather well.

Other matters in the book are not so crucial, and there is a feeling of gracious harmony in the mingling of reason and revelation. The chapters need not be read in sequence or in their entirety. One can let the book fall open at any page and find enlightening and heartening inspiration. The scholar back of it all shows through in the frequent references to select literature on the subject. For the sake of tidy pages the publisher relegated the "chapter and verse" notations to the back, where there is also an index for looking up special topics. The contents of the book would suffer from any attempt to summarize them. Instead, let the reader just sample them to whet his taste for the rest. But the achievements of the author it is possible to summarize, as he unconsciously does on page 238: "All the valuable principles, insights and conclusions of philosophy are absorbed into and are serviceable to a theological view of life."